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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

FRANK 1. FAZZIO, JR., and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.

EDWARD J MASON, an individual,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD

)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 36068-2009
Ada County Docket No. 2008-1215

)
)
)
)

)

Defendant-Appellant.

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on October I, 2009.

Therefore, good cause

appearIng,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below,
file stamped copies ohvhich accompanied this Motion:
1. Supplemental Judgment for Attorneys Fees and Costs, file-stamped September 17,2009.

, .C-

DATED this

L

day of October 2009.

For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

cc: Counsel of Record

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

FRANK 1. FAZZIO, JR., and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC,
P laintiffs-Respondents,
v.

EDWARD 1. MASON, an individual,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENTTHERECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 36068-2009
Ada County Docket No. 2008-1215

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on March 2, 2010.

Therefore, good cause

appearIng,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Motion for Entry of Judgment, file-stamped April 3, 2009;
2. Affidavit of Frank J. Fazzio, Jf. in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment and in
Opposition of Request for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal, file-stamped April 3,
2009;
3. Objection to Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, file-stamped April 3,
2009;
4. Memorandum in Support of Objection to Request for Certification for Interlocutory
Appeal, file-stamped April 3, 2009:
5. Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support, file-stamped April 7,2009;
6. Response to Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support, file-stamped
April 15, 2009;
7. Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Enforcement of Judgment of Specific
Performance, file-stamped April 27, 2009;
8. Defendant's Requested Conditions for Entry of the Judgment, Objection to Entry of the
Judgment and Request for Hearing, file-stamped April 27, 2009;
9. Memorandum Clarifying Proposed Judgment as to Kuna LID and Objection to Request
for Hearing, file-stamped May 5,2009;

- Docket No. 36068-2009

10. Memorandum Re: Motion to Reconsider and Entry of Judgment, file-stamped May 28,
2009;
11. Judgment, file-stamped May 28, 2009; and
12. Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Second Objection and Motion to Disallow
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Fees and Amended Memorandum of Costs and
Fees, file-stamped August 5, 2009.
DATED this

41: day of March 2010.
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

cc: Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 36068-2009

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
"
.F

'~~'"""'-"."
".,... ... , , _ .

ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
BOISE,ID 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559
ATTO&~EY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215

MOTION FOR ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio and Idaho
Livestock Company, LLC, by and through their attorney of record, Derek A. Pica, and
pursuant to the Memorandum Decision and Order filed by the Court on December 30,
2008, moves this Court for entry of a JUdgment in conformance with the Memorandum
Decision and Order as Defendant has failed to specifically perform the contracts to
purchase Plaintiffs' real property as Ordered. A true and correct copy of the proposed
Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum and Affidavit filed concurrently
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herewith and the record on file herein.
Oral argument is hereby requested.
DATED this

M

:s; -

day of April, 2009.

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
M

I, the undersigned, certify that on the ;g -- day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT to be forwarded with all
required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure, to the following person(s):
Merlyn W. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

Derek A. Pica
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DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
BOISE,ID 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BARNo. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215

JUDG:MENT

)

On December 30,2008, the above-entitled Court filed its Memorandum Decision
and Order in the above-entitled action ordering Defendant to specifically perform the
contracts he entered into to purchase Plaintiffs' real property within thirty (30) days of
December 30, 2008. Defendant, having failed to specifically perform the contracts as
ordered, and for good cause appearing;

JUDGMENT - Page 1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That judgment is entered against Defendant, Edward J. Mason in favor of

Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio, in the amount of$1,530,000.00
plus contractual interest thereon in the amount of $393,859.71 through April 20, 2009 for
a total Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio in the
amount of$1,923,859.70 plus interest thereon at the statutory rate of7.625% per annum.
Upon satisfaction of the Judgment, Plaintiffs, Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio
shall convey the real property that is the subject matter of the Agreement to Resolve
Dispute Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement Dated April 12, 2006
So As to Avoid Arbitration they entered into with Defendant on September 12,2007, so
long as Plaintiffs have not foreclosed on their vendor's lien against said real property.
2.

That judgment is entered against Defendant, Edward J. Mason in favor of

Plaintiff, Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, in the amount of $2,000,000.00 plus interest
thereon in the amount of$514,848.68 through April 20, 2009 for a total Judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, Idaho Livestock Company, LLC in the amount of$2,514,848.68 plus
interest thereon at the statutory rate of7.625% per annum. Upon satisfaction ofthe
Judgment, Plaintiff, Idaho Livestock Company, LLC shall convey the real property that is
the subject matter of the Agreement to Resolve Dispute Arising Out of Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement Dated April 12,2006 So As to A void Arbitration they
entered into with Defendant on September 12,2007, so long as Plaintiff, Idaho Livestock
Company, LLC has not foreclosed on its vendor's lien against said real property.
3.

That Judgment is entered in favor of both Plaintiffs and against Defendant

in the amount of the City ofKuna Sewer LID that Defendant encumbered against
JUDGMENT - Page 2

Plaintiffs' real property when due, plus statutory interest thereon from the due date until
paid. The Court shall reserve jurisdiction over the amount of the City ofKuna Sewer LID
should a dispute arise as to the amount thereof and the payment due date.

DATED this _ _ day of April, 2009.

DISTRICT JUDGE

JUDGMENT - Page 3

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
BOISE,ID 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWp,R]) J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215
AFFIDA VIT OF FRANK J.
FAZZIO, JR. IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION OF REQUEST
FOR CERTIFICATION OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

)
) ss.
)

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR., being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1.

That Affiant is a Plaintiff in the above entitled action and has personal

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
J1JDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION OF REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 1

EXHIBIT ,\

'tS

If

k.l1owledge of all facts set forth herein.
2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a letter

from Defendant that was hand delivered to Affiant's home on February 25,2009.
3.

That as of the date of this Affidavit, despite a court order requiring

Defendant to close on the purchase of Plaintiffs' real property, Defendant has failed to
close.
DATED this

/';1-

day of April,

2009~

? _

~f

1-\
Frank J Fazzio',' Jf.
I

!

i

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befordme his -4::::::'=YII
(

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at:--.:::.~----,=-_·_ _ _ _ __
My Commission Expires: 2..b II

AFFIDA VIT OF FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION OF REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
rtf)

I, the undersigned, certifY that on the ~.- day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK 1. FAZZIO, JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION OF REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the
methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the
following person(s):
Merlyn VI. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

Derek A. Pica

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION OF REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 3

PAGE

FAZZIO QINIC

Febro~ry 25~

01

2009

Delivered by hand

Dr. and MJs. Fazzio:
Something has been nagging at me:
I am not trying to get out of buying your property. It's not a case ofwon't~ it's a cac;e of
can.'t.
Initially I believed we didn't have a contract and you would keep the $68,000.
I signed a new contract with you and set about getting approvals and funds in order to
close. I obtained the approvals, spending $96,008 in the process. The financial world
has been in disarray since and r have been unable to close.
I have used every scrap of my resources to survive individually and as a company. J
provided you complete :financial information. \Vhen. you look at it, look at both the asset
side and the liability side. I will provide the most recent .information as soon. as 2008
year-end is completed.
I am trying to hang on, recover, and close on your property. 1 am a man of my word. I
don't need fue courts to force me.
I feel responsible to pay th.e City ofKuna for the LID. I fed responsible for the delay in
yoUt' personal plans. I want to close, but an economic environment outside of my control

has made it impossible so far. The circumsta:oces surrounding me may force me to
declare bankruptcy_ If 1 am nOt required to declare bankruptcy, r ""iII close on your
property when I am able to do so.
Ted Mason

EXHlBIT.l

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302

APR 0 3 200'9

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

BOISE,ID 83702

By I<..ATHY J, BIEHL
DEPIJTY

TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BARNo. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
FRANK 1. FAZZIO, lR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LrvESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

EDWARD 1. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

Case No. CV OC 0801215

OBJECTION TO REQUEST
FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Frank 1. Fazzio, lr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio and Idaho
Livestock Company, LLC, by and through their attorney of record, Derek A. Pica, and
pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, objects to Defendant's Request for
Certification for Interlocutory Appeal on the following grounds:
1.

The district court's decision granting summary judgment does not involve

a ... "controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial difference of opinion,"
LA.R. 12 and BudeIl v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d 701 (1983).
2.

An interlocutory appeal will substantially prejudice the Plaintiffs as the

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 1

"Q'(

status of the real property they own will be clouded until such time as a :fmal judgment is
entered.
3.

The granting of an interlocutory appeal could lead to a second appeal once

a final judgment is filed.
4.

The entry of a final judgment in this action will not delay Defendant's

ability to appeal as a final judgment can be entered by the district court immediately.
Plaintiffs further object to Defendant's request that their Request for Certification
for Interlocutory Appeal be detennined without oral argument as this request is contrary
to LA.R. 12(b) except that any hearing is to be expedited as the district court must issue a
decision within twenty-one (21) days of the Request for Certification for Interlocutory
Appeal.
This Objection to Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal is supported
by the Memorandum and Affidavit filed concurrently herewith and by the record on file
herein.
Oral argument is hereby requested.

It.P
DA TED this

)

day of April, 2009

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Plaintiffs

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
L4
I, the undersigned, certify that on the
day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the
method(s) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the
following person(s):

:>

Merlyn W. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

/

Derek A. Pica

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 3

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
BOISE,ID 83702

.

APr;'
I

! \.

[\ '1
'j

\ . .'

:\

,

,.-----"1

TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BARNo. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215

MElViORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST
FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jf. and Cindy Ann Fazzio and Idaho
Livestock Company, LLC, by and through their attorney of record, Derek A. Pica, and file
with the Court their Memorandum in Support of Objection to Request for Certification
for Interlocutory Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 30, 2008, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision and
Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered Defendant, Edward

1. Mason, hereinafter "Mason," to specifically perform on the contracts he had entered
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 1

into with Plaintiffs, Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio, and Idaho Livestock
Company, LLC, hereinafter collectively "Fazzio" to purchase their real property within
thirty (30) days of the Memorandum Decision and Order, or a judgment for the purchase
price would be entered. As of the date of this Memorandum, Mason has failed to comply
with the court order and close on his purchase of Fazzio's real property.
In ruling that the contracts Mason entered into with Fazzio be enforced by specific
performance, the district court found as follows:
The Court finds that there is good reason to enforce the contract by
specific performance, rather than the legal remedy of contract damages
ordinarily available. Not only is the real property itself inherently unique,
the real property was significantly and materially altered by Mason in
anticipation of the sale by causing it to be annexed into the City of Kuna.
Furthermore, the contract was for a cash sale, as in Perron. The Court
cannot find that the present case presents a situation where performance is
so unlikely and impossible that it would render the order futile. Rather,
the Court, in its discretion, finds that the appropriate remedy is to order
specific performance, and if performance is not completed, judgment can
be entered for the purchase price. (Emphasis added).
(Memorandum Decision and Order dated December 30,2008, p. 6).
ARGUMENT

1.
MASON FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DISTRlCT COURT'S MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER INVOLVES A CONTROLLING QUESTION OF LAW
AS TO WHICH THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR DIFFERENCE OF
OPINION SO AS TO JUSTIFY AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.
Rule I2(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides:
Rule 12. Appeal by permission.
(a) Criteria for permission to appeal. Permission may be granted by
the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory order or decree of a
district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an interlocutory order of
an administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable under these
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 2

rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an irrlluediate
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation. (Emphasis added).
LA.R. I2(a). In Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,665 P.2d 701 (1983), the Idaho Supreme
Court ruled that the court intends I.A.R. 12 to create an appeal ... "in the exceptional
case" holding:
It was the intent of LA.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an
interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or
legal questions of first impression are involved. The Court also considers
such factors as the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the
effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court pending the
appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is
finally entered by the district court, and the case workload of the appellate
courts. No single factor is controlling in the Court's decision of
acceptance or rejection of an appeal by certification, but the Court intends
by Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend
by the rule to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right
under I.A.R. 11. For these reasons, the Court has, over the six year
experience of the use of Rule 12, accepted only a limited number of the
. applications for appeal by certification.

105 Idaho at 4. In this action, there is not a substantial legal issue ... "of great public
interest" or a legal question ... "of first impression." 105 Idaho at 4. In fact, the only
issue is whether the district court properly exercised its discretion. In P.O. Ventures, Inc.
v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 159 P.3d 870 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy that can provide relief
when legal remedies are inadequate. Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho
820,823, 136 P.3d 291, 294 (2006). The inadequacy of remedies at law is
presumed in an action for breach of a real estate purchase and sale
agreement due to the perceived uniqueness of land. Id The decision to
grant specific performance is a matter within the district court's discretion.
Id When making its decision the court must balance the equities between
the parties to determine whether specific performance is appropriate. Id
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
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(Emphasis added).
144 Idaho at 237. 1'1 Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue
as one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and
applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through
an exercise of reason. In re Jane Doe, 1, 145 Idaho 650, 651, 182 P.3d
707, 708 (2008) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
196 P.3d at 347. In this action, the district court clearly recognized the issue of whether
to grant specific performance was one of discretion. As such, the first prong of the test
was met.
The second prong of the test as to whether the district court acted within its
discretion is whether the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
applied the appropriate legal standards. Clearly the district court met this standard. In its
Memorandum Decision and Order the district

COlh'i

cited Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578,

701 P.2d 198 (1985) which held:
The overwhelming weight of authority states that specific performance
is as freely available to vendors as it is to purchasers. E.g., Tombari v.
Griepp, 55 Wash.2d 771, 350 P.2d 452, 454-55 (1960) (string cite of
treatises and cases); 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance, § 112 (1973);
Crib bet, Principles of the Law of Property, p. 144 (2d ed. 1975).
108 Idaho at 582. The district court also analyzed the legal principal of impossibility.
Mason argued that equity dictated that enforcement by specific performance should not
be granted where such an order would be futile. Mason cites Paloukos v. Intermountain
Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 74, 588 P.2d 939 (1978); Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112,
227 P.2d 351 (1951); and Childs v. Reed, 34 Idaho 450, 202 P.2d 685 (1921) in support
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
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of his argument that the district court should not have ordered specific performance
because Mason was unable to perform. (This is an impossibility defense which Mason
specifically waived and then went forvvard and argued in the district court. Mason
substituted the word "futile" for impossible in his argument). The three (3) Idaho cases
cited by Mason fail to raise any legal issues that are of great public interest or legal
questions of first impression. In fact, all three (3) cases are factually driven and only one
(1) involves the sale of real property.
In Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Company, 99 Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939
(1978), the issue revolved around the purchase and sale of a pickup truck. In Paloukos,
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld on appeal the district court's denial of specific
performance under the Uniform Commercial Code holding:
The final issue presented is whether the district court properly
dismissed that portion ofPaloukos' complai...'1t which sought specific
performance of the alleged contract. Under the DCC specific performance
is available to a purchaser where "the good,; are unique or in other proper
circumstances." I.C. s 28-2-716(1).

*

*

*

In his pleadings Paloukos alleged no facts suggesting anything unique
about the pickup involved. The market value of such a vehicle is readily
ascertainable and Paloukos' pleadings indicate no reason why damages
would not be adequate relief Moreover, the sole remaining defendant in
this case, Intermountain, is a dealer, not a manufacturer, of automobiles.
Paloukos does not allege that Intermountain is in possession of a
conforming pickup which it could sell him. Indeed, the record suggests
quite the contrary. It is well established that the courts will not order the
impossible, such as ordering the seller under a sales contract to sell to the
buyer that which the seller does not have. See Moody v. Crane, 34 Idaho
103, 199 P. 652 (1921); 5A A. Corbin, Contracts s 1170 (1964); 2
Restatement of Contracts s 368, ilIus. 1 (1932). We therefore affirm the
district court's dismissal of that portion ofPaloukos' complaint seeking
specific performance. (Emphasis added).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL - Page 5

99 Idaho at 745-746. Clearly thjs holding is based in part on the defense of impossibility.

(In Paloukos, the court did not discuss objective impossibility v. subjective impossibility,
e.g. State ofIdaho v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 198 P.3d 749 (App. 2008». In Anderson v.
Whipple, 71 Idaho 112,227 P.2d 351 (1951), the issue involved the enforcement of an
oral lease of real property with yearly rent based upon a customary crop rental for the life
of the lessee. The lease agreement did not set forth a yearly lease rate. 71 Idaho at 124.
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court holding:
An agreement, which leaves any of the material terms or conditions for
future determination, cannot be enforced. (Cites omitted).

*

*

*

Equity will not enter a decree for specific performance the enforcement
of which is not practicable or feasible. These parties have had many
disagreements as to what the rent should be and since 1946 have been
entirely unable to reach any agreement at all. Under such circumstances,
to enforce the decree entered, the court must, necessarily, either retain
jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the reasonable rental each year
during the life of the plaintiff, or the parties would be required to have the
rental determined by jury each year, so long as they remain unable to
agree. Such a result is abhorrent to equity. 49 Am.Jur., Specific
Performance, secs. 70 and 72. It would impose upon the plaintiff a
contract which she refuses to enter into voluntarily. Machold v. Farnan,
14 Idaho 258,94 P. 170. Further as to this aspect of the case, the contract
lacks the necessary mutuality of remedy. It is apparent that the part that
remains executory on the part of the defendants, that is, the occupation of
the premises, and the diligent, faithful, husbandlike farming thereof by the
defendants in the years to come, cannot be enforced. (Emphasis added).
71 Idaho at 125. The "practicability" and feasibility in Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho
112,227 P.2d 351 (1951) revolved around the fact that the alleged lease contract left
material terms for future determination and therefore, could not be enforced. In Childs v.
Reed, 34 Idaho 450, 202 P. 685 (1921), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district
MEMORAl\TDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
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court and held specific performru'1ce was not available where husband contracted to sell
real property that was community, but his wife refused to join the husband in the
conveyance. 202 P. at 687. It was impossible for the husband to convey the real property
without his wife's execution of the deed pursuant to Idaho statutes.
The three (3) cases cited by Mason revolve around the doctrine of impossibility.
The district court in this action, in analyzing the facts and applying the appropriate legal
standards, ruled as follows:
The Court cannot find that the present case presents a situation where
performance is so unlikely and impossible that it would render the order
futile.
(Memorandum Decision and Order dated December 30, 2008, p. 6). There is nothing of
great public interest or a legal question of first impression in regard to the law applied by
the district court, nor is there a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of that law in
the state ofIdaho.
The third prong is whether the district court reached its decision by exercise of
reason. In this action, the district court clearly determined the remedy of specific
performance was appropriate through an exercise of reason when applying the facts to the
law. The following facts were undisputed by Mason:
A.

Mason entered into Purchase and Sale Agreements with Fazzio to
purchase certain real property in Kuna, Idaho with a closing date of
February 26, 2007.

B.

WillIe the Purchase and Sale Agreements were pending, Mason caused the
real property owned by Fazzio to be annexed into the city of Kuna.
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C.

While the Purchase and Sale Agreements were pending, Mason caused the
real property o'\vned by Fazzio to be encumbered by the KUlla sewer LID
(Local Improvement District) thereby causing an obligation to the city of
KUlla in excess of $400,000.00.

D.

Mason failed to close on the Purchase and Sale Agreements on or before
February 26,2007.

E.

To avoid arbitration, Mason and Fazzio entered into a Settlement
Agreement whereby the parties would close on December 21, 2007 and
Mason would pay twelve percent on the entire purchase price through the
closing date.

F.

Mason and Fazzio agreed that upon either parties' breach of the Settlement
Agreement, the remedy would be specific performance.

G.

Neither the original Purchase and Sale Agreements nor the Settlement
Agreement was contingent upon Mason obtaining financing for his
purchase of Fazzio's real property.

H.

Mason admitted he breached the Settlement Agreements for which he gave
no excuse, including declining to plead the doctrine of impossibility as a
defense.

1.

Fazzio's real property is inherently unique and Mason offered no evidence
to rebut its uniqueness.

J.

There is a presumption as to the inadequacy of remedies at law in an
action for breach of a real estate purchase and sale agreement because of
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the uniqueness of land that Mason offered no evidence to rebut.
K.

Mason significantly and materially altered the real property which was
farmground by causing it to be annexed into the city of Kuna in
anticipation of closing.

L.

The Settlement Agreements called for a cash sale at closing making the
Settlement Agreements enforceable by entering a Judgment for the
purchase price.

Mason clearly breached both the Purchase and Sale Agreements and then the
subsequent Settlement Agreements. Now, Mason is requesting the district court to not
hold him accountable on the basis he cannot perform. This is not a viable defense
because it is subjective as to Mason. This court has already correctly ruled pursuant to
established case law that Mason's inability to perform is not a defense. See State of
Idaho v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 198 P.3d 749 (App. 2008) and Christy v. Pilkington,
224 Ark. 407,273 S.W.2d 533 (1954). Mason has violated the order requiring him to
specifically perform in thirty (30) days and despite his "unclean hands," comes to the
court for the additional relief of being allowed to appeal before judgment is entered. This
is but another delay tactic on Mason's part to avoid accountability. In the meantime,
Fazzio has been required to endure having his real property "tied up" by Mason well over
two (2) years because Mason failed to honor his agreements. If an interlocutory appeal is
allowed before judgment is entered, there will be an additional delay of several months, if
not a year, before Fazzio will have an enforceable remedy. In the meantime, Fazzio owns
real property he cannot sell, etc. because of the agreements Mason breached. Further,
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Fazzio has an encumbrance to pay that is substantial to the City of Kuna. The
encumbrance was solely caused by Mason. As such, the district court should enter a
judgment and then Mason can appeal as a matter of right.

II.
PURSUANT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IN THE MEMORANDlJM
DECISION AND ORDER FILED DECEMBER 30, 2008, JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE IMMEDIATELY ENTERED AGAINST MASON FOR THE
PURCHASE PRICE.
In the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed on December 30,
2008, the district court ruled as follows:
Specific performance on the contracts is to be completed within thirty
days of the date of this order; if not so accomplished, a judgment for the
purchase price may be entered, upon satisfaction of which the properties
must be conveyed to Mason.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 30,2008, p. 6).
Mason has failed to close. As such, judgment should immediately be entered for
the purchase price. There is nothing to be gained by allowing an interlocutory appeal
before judgment is entered as there is no pending trial that could be rendered moot should
Mason prevail on appeal. Instead, the district court will be left with an open case file for
a substantial period of time solely because judgment has not been entered. An
interlocutory appeal will also create the possibility of two (2) appeals. A delay in the
entry of judgment will be prejudicial to Fazzio as Fazzio's real property will continue to
be held in "limbo." In this entire proceeding, Fazzio has done nothing wrong. It is
Mason that has breached agreements and violated a court order. Once judgment is
entered, Fazzio can foreclose on his vendor's lien against the real property that is the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
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subject of the Settlement Agreements and convey clear title to the buyer in foreclosure.
Once the property is sold, the amount of damages Fazzio incurred will be fixed (e.g. the
remaining portion of the judgment) and Fazzio can execute on the remaining portion of
the judgment.

CONCLUSION
Mason's Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal should be denied and a
judgment should be entered immediately by the district court. It would be clearly
inequitable for Mason to continue to encumber Fazzio's real property for an additional
period oftime while an interlocutory appeal is pending. Judgment should be entered so
Fazzio can clear his title.
~

DATED this

) -

day of April,

(!-_

2009'~1(

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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ThT THE DISTlUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, hQsband an4 wife, and IDAliO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CaseNQ. CV OC 0801215

MOTION FOR. RECONSIDERATION
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

)
)

-------------------------------------~)
Defendant Edward J. Mason, by and through his counsel ofreoor4, Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley, LLP submits this Motion for Reconsideration and Memoranclum in StJpport.

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Mason has already filed a request that the Court's Order Granting SuuunwY
Judgment be certified for interlocutory appeal. The briefing filed ill support of that request
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explains the enoneo·u.s nature of the Court!s order granting Plaintiffs specific performance and
explains how the Court's order results in a windfall to Plaintiffs and is inconsistent with Idaho
law. That briefmg is incorporated herein by refere·nce. An interlocutory appeal would allow the

Idaho Supreme Court to correot the Court's order and willUkely result in a remand for this Court
to determine an appropriate remedy at law, A much more efficjent procedure would be for this

Court to reconsider the order granting specific performanoe,
If the Court denies :Mr. Mason.' s request that the order grantmg summary judgment be
certified for interlocutory appeal, Mr. Mason respectfully req'llests that the Court vacate the order
granting specific performance (and ordering specifio perfoqnan,ce), declare the sales transactions
rescinded and determine damages) if any occurreq, to be a'W&Xded to Plaintiffs.

II. ARGUMENT
As explained in Mr. Mason's briefing in connection vvith the request for certification for

interlooutory appeal, the Court's order granting summary judgment and ordering specific
performance is erroneous. It is indiap1..l.table that Mr. Mason d.oes not have the approxilnately
$3.6 Million that would be required to close on the Su,bject Properties as or4ered by the Court.
See the Affidavits ofBdward I. Mas~ file<! Affidavit of Edward 1. Mason, filed October 1.
2008 and October 10, 2008 (filed under seal). In ordering specific perfonnance, the Court did
not follow the well-established rule that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including
specific performance, that is not feasible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 125,
227 P.2d 351, 359 (1951), overruled on other grOtlIlQ.s by DaVid Steed and AS90ciates, Inc. v.
Young~

115 Idaho 247~ 766 P.2d 717 (1988) ("Equity will not enter a decree for specific

performance the enforcement of which is not practicable or feasible.;'); Paloulcos v.
Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740, 745..46, 588 P.2d 939, 944~45 (1978) (disnllssing
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claim for specific performance because ~'[i]t is well established that the courts win not order the
impossible~t);

Childs v.

Reed~

202 P. 685, 686 (Idaho 1921) C''Where the contract is of such a

nature that obedience to the decree cannot be obtained by the ordinary processes oftb.e court,
eqllity will decli~le to interfere.").

Rather than apply this equitable rule, the Court applied and rejected the sllPstantive'
contract defense of impossibility of performance as if'the two rules were one and th~ same. The
Court should reconsider this analysis as fue two rules are. not one and the

sam~.

The eq'llitable

rule merely precllldes an order of equitable relief and leaves the plaintiff with a remedy in law,
i,e., damages. The substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is a complete defense to a

contract imd leaves the plaintiff with no remedy at all, either equitable or at l~w. See Landis v,

Hodgson, 109 Ida,ho 252,251, 706 P.2d 1363) 1368 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the
substanthre doctrine of impossibility of performance results in the party asserting the defense

being "reliev~d ofllis d'Q.ty to perfonn") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 264 (1981).

This is a case in which a remecly at law is appropri~te, likely measured by the difference
between the contract price and the value oIllie Subject Properties at the time of the breqoh.. In
fact, PLaintiffs recognized as much in their Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint, filed
October 31,2008. Up until that time, Plaintiff's had reque~ted only ~ awmd of speoific

performance. In their Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint the Plaintiffs req1.lested, in the
alternative, an award of damages.
An award of damages at law is the only appropriate remedy in tWs ca$O. TIle Court'S
order proves flus point:

Specific performance on the contracts is to be completed within
thirty days of the date of this order; unot so accomplished, a
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jtldgment for the purchase price may be entered, upon satisfaction
of which the properties m~ be conveyed to Mason.

See Memorandmn Decision and Order. p. 6.
The remedy ordered by the Court is cleaxly inappropriate as it 'Will f.'esult in a windfall to
Plaintiffs. Under the Court~s order, a judgment will be entere<:l for the entire purclv:lse price if
Mason does not close on the Subject Property within 30 days. Given that Ma~on qoes not have

$3.6 Million, the Court's order is effectively a $3,6 Millionju4gment. What will happen next is
that Fazzio will attempt to collect on the judgment by liquidating Mason's "ssets. Plaintiffs,
however, will not get much. As explained in Mason's supplemental a:ffldavit filed October 10,
2008, the vast majority of Mason's assets are in the form of real property, which serves as the
collateral on bank loans. It will be extremely difficul~ to sell those properties under the cuP"ent
real estate market conditions. More importantly~ due to the bursting of the housing bubble,
Mason already owes the banks more than the value ofth.e properties. Thus, liquidating those
assets win not produce any money to satisfy the judgment.
Even if Plaintiffs seize every asset Mr. Mason owns, they will not be able to collect on

the entire judgment. However, they would be able to collect ~ amotlnt of money - perhaps a
few htmdred thousand dollars. If they do so, Plaintiffs will end Up with a windfall. Plaintiffs
will bo able to collect some part of the judgment - and in the me8.lltime banlaupt Mason and take
thejobs away from Mason's remaining employees and contractors. Plaintiffs will getwh.ateve~
they can collect from Mason, and thev will also get to keep the ~ubiect Property. This

windfall is what makes the Court's order so clearly wrong. It would be one thing if Plaintiffs

were awarded damage$ in the fonn of a money judgment for the difference betweeu the purchase
prioe and the value of the Subject Property. But Plaintiffs here effectively get both a money
judgment and they get to keep the property.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 4

APR. 7.2009

12:59PM

NO. 399

P.S/24

Indeed, in a recent telephone conference, Plaintiffs! counsel explained e}Uj.ctly what
Plaintiffs intend to do to collect what they can from the judgmeTlt and still keep the Subject
Properties. During that conversation, Plaintiffs' coun::;el stated that Plaintiffs intend to take the

fonowing actions: Plaintiffs intend to obtain entry of a Judgment il1 this mE!-tter anq proceed to
levy execution upon the assets oftlle Defendant. Plaintiffs will treat the title to the.r~l est4te,
which is the subject of the sales that are the subject maiter of this action, as equitably owned by
Defendant under the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion. Plaintiffs intend to levy execution upon
the real properties and cause them to be sold at a Sheriffs Sille. It is Plaintiffs l intent to bi4 in a
portion of their judgments upon the real properti~ to recover complete title to the properties.
When that is accomplished, Plaintiffs will then own both the teal properties Imd the paiMee of
their Judgment, See Affidavit of Merlyn Clark, filed concurrently herewith,

m.

CONCLUSION

If tlle Court does not certify its order granting smnmary judgment for intetlocutolY
appeal, Mr. Mason respectfully requests that the Court reconsicler the order. The order does not
follow the wellHcstablished rule that a court should. not award an equitable reme4.y like specific
performance whel'e such an order would be futile, as is clearly the case here. More importantly,
the order grants Plaintiffs a windfall in that, as a practical matter, it allows them to keep the
Subject PropertieB and have an approximately $3.6 Millionjtldgment agaiwt Mr. Mason. The
order granting summary judgment should be vacated. The Court ~hould decl~e the sales
transactions rescinded and detenuine da:mages~ if any occurred. to be awardeq to Plaintiffs.
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NO. 399
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~ay of April: 2009.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS'& HAWLEY LLP

~~
~
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD 1. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

--------------------------~)
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio and Idaho
Livestock Company, LLC, by and through their attorney of record, Derek A. Pica, and file
with the Court their Response to Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in
Support.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The facts in this action have been previously set forth and need not be re-stated
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MEMORANDUM IN
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EXHIBIT ~ F

Ii

herein.
ARGUMENT

1.
DEFENDANT, EDWARD J. MASON, PRESENTS NO NEW FACTS UPON WHICH
TO SUPPORT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Defendallt, Edward J. Mason, hereinafter "Mason," presents no new facts upon
which to support his Motion for Reconsideration. While Mason does not set forth the
statutory basis or Rule of Civil Procedure upon which he bases his Motion for
Reconsideration, it is assumed he is proceeding under LR.C.P. 1 1(a)(2)(B). In Jordan v.
Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Watson v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. COlp., 121 Idaho 643,827 P.2d 656 (1992); Slaathaug v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P.2d 107 (1999). After a thorough review of
the record, we conclude that the district court was provided with no new
facts to create an issue for trial, and thus there was no basis upon which to
reconsider its summary judgment order.
135 Idaho at 914. In fact, Mason does not dispute any of the facts upon which the district
court based its Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 30,2008 granting
Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio, and Idaho Livestock Company,
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment. Those significant facts include but are not
limited to the following:
A.

Mason entered into Purchase and Sale Agreements with Fazzio to
purchase certain real property in Kuna, Idaho with a closing date of
February 26,2007.

B.

While the Purchase and Sale Agreements were pending, Mason caused the
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real property owned by Fazzio to be annexed into the city of Kuna.
C.

While the Purchase and Sale Agreements were pending, Mason caused the
real property owned by Fazzio to be encumbered by the Kuna sewer LID
(Local Improvement District) thereby causing an obligation to the city of
Kuna in excess of $400,000.00.

D.

Mason failed to close on the Purchase and Sale Agreements on or before
February 26,2007.

E.

To avoid arbitration, Mason and Fazzio entered into a Settlement
Agreement whereby the parties would close on December 21, 2007 and
Mason would pay twelve percent on the entire purchase price through the
closing date.

F.

Mason and Fazzio agreed that upon either parties' breach of the Settlement
Agreement, the remedy would be specific performance.

G.

Neither the original Purchase and Sale Agreements nor the Settlement
Agreement was contingent upon Mason obtaining financing for his
purchase of Fazzio's real property.

H.

Mason admitted he breached the Settlement Agreements for which he gave
no excuse, including declining to plead the doctrine of impossibility as a
defense.

1.

Fazzio's real property is inherently unique and Mason offered no evidence
to rebut its uniqueness.

1.

There is a presumption as to the inadequacy of remedies at law in an
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action for breach of a real estate purchase and sale agreement because of
the uniqueness of land that Mason offered no evidence to rebut.
K.

Mason significantly and materially altered the real property which was
farmground by causing it to be annexed into the city of Kuna in
anticipation of closing.

L.

The Settlement Agreements called for a cash sale at closing making the
Settlement Agreements enforceable by entering a Judgment for the
purchase price.

All of the above facts overwhelmingly support a judgment for specific performance in the
state ofIdaho. Instead, Mason chooses in his Motion for Reconsideration to argue that it
is not equitable for the Court to enter a judgment for specific performance because such a
judgment would result in a windfall for Fazzio as Fazzio could keep his real property by
foreclosing on the same and then collect the balance of the judgment as well. What
Mason ignores is the following:
A.

If Fazzio were to foreclose on his vendor's lien to his real property, he is
buying real property that was substantially changed in its character by
Mason. Fazzio may not choose to foreclose as he does not want to own
real property that is now annexed into the city of Kuna as a result of
Mason's actions. Mason argues it would be equitable if Fazzio were
required to keep his real property and collect damages as a result of
Mason's breach of contract. HOW IS FORCING FAZZIO TO KEEP
REAL PROPERTY THAT WAS MATERIALLY ALTERED BY
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MASON EQUITABLE?
B.

If Fazzio were to foreclose on his vendor's lien against his real property
and choose to purchase the same, he would be purchasing the real property
subject to the $425,000.00 LID encumbrance that Mason caused to
encumber on Fazzio's real property. This would result in a windfall to
Mason as he would no longer be liable for the Kuna LID encumbrance.

C.

MASON CONTRACTUALLY AGREED TO A REMEDY OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS THEREBY
MAKING THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE A LEGAL
RIGHT. (See Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 4,
2008, pp. 3 - 4).

D.

If Fazzio foreclosed on his vendor's lien it would establish the true market
value of the real property as it has been altered by the annexation and
encumbered by the Kuna LID, all of which was caused by Mason. The
remaining portion ofthe judgment not satisfied by the foreclosure would
be Fazzio's true damages.

These are but some of the reasons that the entry of a judgment for specific performance is
far more equitable given Mason's actions than a remedy of damages. A remedy of
damages does not make Fazzio whole as it would ignore the reality that Mason materially
altered the real property owned by Fazzio. Forcing Fazzio to keep the real property as
materially altered by Mason is clearly inequitable.
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II.
MJ\.80N'S

i~~~GUMENT

THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW HAS NO MERIT

Mason continues to argue the district court erred by not considering three (3)
cases he cited in his Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Mason
ignores the fact that the district court specifically addressed his argument in its
Memorandum Decision filed on December 30,2008, pp. 4 - 5. Mason instead chooses to
ignore the district court's well reasoned decision in which the district court cited Christy
v. Pilkington, 224 Ark. 407,273 S.W.2d 533 (1954), a case directly on point, and Perron
v. Hale, 108 Idaho 478, 701 P.2d 198 (1985). Finally, Mason fails to address State of
Idaho v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520,198 P.3d 749 (App. 2008) which was also specifically
cited by the district court in its Memorandum Decision.

CONCLUSION
Mason's Motion for Reconsideration must be denied and judgment entered.
Mason breached the Purchase and Sale Agreements he entered into with Fazzio by failing
to close on February 26,2007. Mason then breached the settlement agreements he
entered into with Fazzio in order to avoid arbitration proceedings by failing to close in
December, 2007. Mason then violated the district court's Memorandum Decision and
Order filed December 30, 2008 by failing to close on his purchase by January 29, 2009. It
is only equitable if a judgment for specific performance is entered against Mason. In fact,
even Mason agrees that it is equitable that he close on his purchase of Fazzio's real
property. See, Affidavit of Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. filed April 3, 2009, Exhibit "A."
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Finally, it should be noted again that Mason contractually agreed to the remedy of
specific performance should either party breach the settlement agreements.

DATED this

I.L ?\Jday of April, 2009_1\.

. /,

U-I

.Y

j,J-----L

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
REGARDING ENFORCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT OF
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio and Idaho
Livestock Company, LLC, hereinafter collectively "Fazzio," by and through their attorney
of record, Derek A. Pica, and file with the Court their Supplemental Memorandum
Regarding Enforcement of Judgment for Specific Performance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Wednesday, April 15, 2009, the above-entitled matter came before the Court
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EXHIBIT

"0:'

for hearing on Defendant, Edward J. Mason's, hereinafter "Mason," Motion for
Reconsideration and Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal; and on Fazzio's
Motion for Entry of Judgment. The Court denied Mason's Request for Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal. The Court also denied Mason's Motion for Reconsideration except
as to concerns regarding a judgment for specific performance potentially giving Fazzio
both the real property and a monetary judgment and request that both parties suggest
appropriate safeguards to prevent such a scenario and briefmg on that issue.
Given the Court's concerns, it is important to note that Fazzio tendered the deeds
to the subject real property to the title company that was going to close the transaction on
February 26,2007. (See Affidavit of Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. dated November 6,2008).
POINTS AND AUTHORlTIES

1.
THE CONCERNS RAISED BY MASON IN HIS MOTION TO RECONSIDER
HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN APPELLATE DECISIONS
IN OTHER JURlSDICTIONS
Mason raises the issue that it would be unfair that Fazzio both end up with the real
property by purchasing that real property at a sheriff's sale and also have a monetary
judgment. In Renard v. Allen, 237 Or. 406, 391 P.2d 777 (1964), the Oregon Supreme
Court resolved this very issue holding:
Many other jurisdictions have approved of the coupling of a decree of
specific performance with a provision for a sale if the money decree is not
paid. Typical of these cases is the decision in Morgan v. Lewis, 203 Ala.
47,82 So. 7 (1919):

*

*

*

That the remedy by specific performance is available to a vendor of
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land; that the nature ofthe subject-matter of the contract, real estate,
invests the vendor with the right to elect either to sue at law for da..l11ages
for the vendee's breach of the contract or to invoke equity to compel
specific performance of the contract of purchase by the vendee; and that
appropriate decree may enter requiring specific performance on the part of
the vendee, bv a fixed time, after the vendor has deposited in the court, for
the vendee, a conveyance to him of a good title to the lanel; failing
acceptance ofthe deed and payment of the purchase price and interest by
the vendee, it may thereupon be contingently decreed that the land be sold
to satisfy the vendor's demand, and that execution against the vendee issue
to enforce the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price and
interest that the net proceeds of the sale fail to satisfy. * * * (82 So. at 7)
The last portion of the above quotation in effect provides that if the net
proceeds of the sale are not sufficient to satisfy the money decree, the
balance still owing remains a personal decree against the Durchaser which
can be enforced as any other money decree of judgment. (Emphasis
added).
391 P.2d at 779-780. The Oregon Supreme Court went on to hold:
Other decisions approving a provision in the decree providing for a sale in
the event the money decree was not paid are as follows: National Bank of
Kentucky v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F.2d 97 (6 th Cir. 1933); Andrews v.
Sullivan, 7 IlL 327, 334 (1845); Maya Corporation v. Smith, 240 Ala. 371,
199 So. 549, 554 (1941); Standard Lumber Co. v. Florida Industrial Co.,
106 Fla. 884, 141 So. 729, cert. den. 289 U.S. 723, 53 S.Ct. 522, 77 L.Ed.
1474 (1932); Robinson v. Appleton, 124 III 276, 15 N.E. 761,762 (1888);
Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363, 91 N.E. 475,479 (1910); Bockelman v.
Spires, 110 Neb. 234, 193 N.W. 334 (1923); Burnap v. Sidberry, 108 N.C.
307,12 S.E. 1002,1003 (1891); Tombari v. Griepp, 55 Wash.2d 771, 350
P.2d 452 (1960); Big Bay Realty Co. v. Rosenberg, 218 Wis. 318,259
N.W. 735 (1935).
In Walsh, Equity (1930), 428, § 91, it is stated:

* * * Where, however, the purchaser is unable to pay for the property, so
that the decree for specific performance cannot actually be carried out, it is
usual to provide, in that event, that the property be sold and the proceeds
be applied to the payment of the purchase price, and for a judgment against
the purchaser for a deficiency, exactly as in the case of foreclosure by sale
of a mortgage. * * *
On initial reaction a decree of specific performance seems inconsistent
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with a further provision in the decree for a sale. In a suit for specific
perfonnance Ll}e vendor plaintiff must tender a deed of the property into
court. If t.1}e purchaser-defendru'lt complies with the decree and pays the
bala.nce owing, the deed is delivered to the purchaser. The vendor is
divested of any interest in the land, including his fonner lien or right to
enforce his claim against the purchaser's equitable estate. On the other
hand, in foreclosure, the vendor enforces his lien by having the court of
equity proceed against the equitable estate that the purchaser has in the
property because of the contract of sale. Grider v. Turnbow, 162 Or. 622,
641,94 P.2d 285 (1939).
However, on further reflection, the awarding of both a decree for specific
perfonnance, i.e., a money judgment, and providing for a sale, with the
proceeds to be applied on the unpaid judgment, is not incompatible. Fry,
Specific Perfonnance (6 th ed. 1921),549 § 1175, states: 'Still another fonn
of relief open in many cases to a vendor after a judgment for specific
perfonnance, is the enforcement of his lien for unpaid purchase-money,
with interest, and his costs of the action.' It is clear from other parts of the
text that the lien the author has in mind is the equitable lien created by the
contract of sale.
This reasoning, in effect, results in the unpaid vendor being granted
alternative remedies. He can secure a decree for the balance of the unpaid
purchase price, and tender a deed. If the purchaser pays the balance, the
deed is delivered to the purchaser. If the purchase price is not paid, the
vendor may have his alternative remedy, he may have his lien foreclosed,
the property sold, and the proceeds applied upon his judgment for the
purchase price.
There is nothing inconsistent in this procedure. If a specific perfonnance
decree is complied with by the purchaser-defendant, the vendor gives up
his lien and puts complete title, both legal and equitable, in the purchaser.
However, until the purchaser pays the unpaid balance, legal title remains
in the vendor and there is no reason why he should not retain his lien
although he has a judgment for the balance of the purchase price. The
vendor's lien is to secure the purchase price, and the price is not paid
merely because a judgment is entered for the balance. This is the
reasoning stated in Harris v. Halverson, 192 Wis. 71,211 N.W. 295, 297
(1926), as follows:

* * * When an action for specific perfonnance is brought, the plaintiff is
required to tender a deed to become effective upon the compliance by the
vendee with the tenns of the contract. In other words, the action being an
equitable one, he cannot both retain the title to the property absolutely and
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - Page 4

at the same time recover the full amount of the purchase price. However,
until the payment of the purchase price is made, he retains the legal title
and holds the same subject to the payment, as security for any unpaid
amount. * * *
'In an action brought by a vendor for specific performance of a land
contract, the circuit court is autllOrized to order the land described in the
contract sold, and to direct that the proceeds be applied to the payment of
the amount due thereon. By tendering the deed to the vendee, or by
depositing the same with the court, the vendor in legal effect expresses his
intention to part with the title to the vendee, upon performance by the
latter of the terms of the contract, and, on the failure of the vendee to
perform, the property may be ordered sold by the court. The vendor
cannot both retain title and accept the proceeds of the sale. * * *,
There is nothing inequitable, i.e., 'unfair,' about such procedure. By
entering a decree for specific performance the court has transferred an
obligation assumed by contract into a judgment. If the purchaser does not
pay this obligation, it is reasonable that the property should be sold; the
lien on the property was created to insure payment if the purchaser did not
pay this obligation.
391 P.2d 780-782.
In Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc., 184 Mont. 543, 597 P.2d 689 (1979),
the Montana Supreme Court held:
As we have explained above, and as the Oregon court intimates,
Renard v. Allen, 237 Or. At 412, 391 P.2d at 780, land sale contracts, or
contracts for deed as they are commonly called in this state, and not
mortgage transactions differ from one another. Therefore, "(t)he statutory
prohibition against deficiency judgments in mortgage foreclosures is not a
prohibition against awarding specific performance by granting a money
decree and further providing that in the event the decree is not paid the
property shall be sold and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of the
money decree." Renard v. Allen, 237 Or. At 413, 391 P.2d at 780, and
cases subsequently cited.
We concur in the declaration of the Oregon court, to wit:
"There is nothing inequitable, i.e., 'unfair,' about such procedure. By
entering a decree for specific performance the court has transferred an
obligation assumed by contract into ajudgment. If the purchaser does
not pay this obligation, it is reasonable that the property should be sold;
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... " Renard v. Allen, 237 Or. At 416, 391 P.2d at 782.
It is not unfair or inequitable because specific performance of such a
contract is granted in favor of the seller as freely as in favor of the
purchaser, although the relief actually obtained is only a recovery of the
money. Tombari v. Griepp (1960),55 Wash.2d 771, 775-77, 350 P.2d
452,455-56, and the numerous authorities subsequently cited.
597 P.2d at 698. In Aveco Properties, Inc. v. E. J. Nicholson, 229 Mont. 417, 747 P.2d
1358 (1987), the Montana Supreme Court, citing Glacier Campgroun.d v. Vlild Rivers,
Inc., 184 Mont. 543, 597 P.2d 689 (1979), upheld a district court's judgment that granted
specific performance to a seller's successor in part as follows:
On May 23, 1986, the District Court issued a final judgment granting
A veco specific performance of the contract for deed and judgment as
follows:
1. Granted A veco judgment for principal, interest, attorney fees, costs
advanced and late charges.
2. Granted the appellant Nicholson until June 9, 1986 to pay that
judgment including all accrued costs and fees incurred by the
respondent.
3. Provided for the docketing of the judgment with authority for the
respondent to file his transcript of judgment in any jurisdiction.
4. Provided that if the buyer did not satisfy the judgment then the
respondent could sell "any interest held by the Defendant in the real
property" at a sheriff's sale with delivery of the deed after the period of
redemption pursuant to Title 25, Ch. 13, MCA.
5. Provided that any deficiency from the sale will continue as a
judgment to the extent of the deficiency after the sale.
6. Provided the appellant a statutory right of redemption pursuant to
Title 25, Ch. 13, MCA and provided that any purchaser would be
entitled to immediate possession after the sale and for delivery of the
deed from the sheriff to purchaser after the period of redemption.
747 P.2d at 1360. The judgment entered by the Montana district court is consistent with
Fazzio's request for judgment and conforms to well established case law in other
jurisdictions. Fazzio's counsel has been unable to fmd any case law in the state ofIdaho
specific to the subject of the terms of a judgment for specific performance.
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II.
IDAHO STATUTES AND CASE LAW PROVIDE SAFEGUARDS FOR
THE FORECLOSURE OF A VENDOR'S LIEN
Idaho Code § 45-801 provides:
45-801. Vendor's lien. - One who sells real property has a vendor's
lien thereon, independent of possession, for so much of the price as
remains unpaid and unsecured otherwise than by the personal obligation of
the buyer.
Fazzio has a vendor's lien pursuant to statute. In Quintana v. Anthony, 109 Idaho 977,
712 P.2d 678 (1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
Title 45 of the Idaho Code also recognizes a vendor's lien. "One who
sells real property has a vendor's lien thereon, independent of possession,
for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured otherwise than
by the personal obligation of the buyer." I.C. § 45-801. A vendor's lien,
like a mortgage, is a security device. But unlike a mortgage, which arises
from agreement of the parties, a vendor's lien arises by operation oflaw,
unless waived. It is a codified creature of equity. See generally D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.15 (1973)
(hereafter cited as DOBBS). Accordingly, the vendor's lien is "not a
specific and absolute charge on the realty but a mere equitable right to
resort to it [i.e., the property] on failure of payment by the vendee."
Estates o/Somers v. Clearwater Power Co., 107 Idaho 29, 30,684 P.2d
1006, 1007 (1984), quotingfrom Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal.App.2d 107,305
P.2d 61, 68 (1956) (bracketed language added in Somers).
In light of this distinction, we think it would be unwise to lay down a
rigid general rule that a vendor's lien must in all respects be treated as a
mortgage. A court in equity may determine the scope ofthe lien and how
it will be enforced in each case. This is especially true where, as in Idaho,
the statute recognizing a vendor's lien makes no explicit provision for its
enforcement. See generally 51 AM.JUR.2d Liens § 65 (1970).
Nevertheless, the legislative policies underlying our mortgage foreclosure
statutes should guide the court's exercise of its equitable powers when
enforcing a vendor's lien. In Wells v. Francis, 7 Colo. 396, 4 P. 49 (1884),
the Colorado Supreme Court held that a suit on a vendor's lien is
analogous to an action seeking foreclosure of a mortgage. Indeed, our
Supreme Court, in Farnsworth v. Pepper, 27 Idaho 154, 160, 148 P. 48, 51
(1915), has held that the statute now codified as I. C. § 6-101 may be
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applied to liens other than mortgages.
109 Idaho at 980. The Idaho Court of Appeals went on to hold:
Idaho Code § 6-101 was supplemented by I.e. § 6-108, the deficiency
limitation statute, during the Great Depression. The statutory scheme
responded to a haunting spectre of mortgage debtors defaulting on loans,
losing their property in distress sales and encountering massive
deficiencies. These statutes have protected debtors by sheltering
u..n.u'llortgaged property from potential execution until mortgaged property
has been sold in ajudicially supervised foreclosure. The statutes also have
established a right to redeem the property sold and, as noted earlier, they
have restricted the amounts of deficiency judgments after foreclosure
sales. In our view, parallel protections are appropriate, and may be
provided in equity, where sellers of real property assert the existence of
vendors' liens.
109 Idaho at 980. Idaho Code § 6-108 provides:
6-108. Deficiency judgments - Amount restricted. - No court in the
state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment in any
case involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount
greater than the difference between the mortgage indebtedness, as
determined by the decree, plus costs of foreclosure and sale, and the
reasonable value of the mortgaged property, to be determined by the court
in the decree upon the taking of evidence of such value.
The above statutes and case law let forth the methods for foreclosing on a
vendor's lien and the statutory protection for Mason. In addition, Mason would have
redemptive rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-402 which would protect him from Fazzio
entering a credit bid at a sheriff s sale for an amount less than fair market value because
Fazzio would not risk Mason redeeming the real property at a price less than fair market
value. Mason has already been given thirty (30) days by the Court to close on his
purchase of Fazzio's real property. He failed to do so. therefore, Judgment should be
entered for the contract purchase price plus interest, attorney fees and costs. The deed to
the real property has been tendered. The Court should provide in the Judgment that
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Fazzio shall foreclose on his vendor's lien and the real property sold at Sheriffs sale.
This will accomplish two (2) benefits. First, it will establish the amount of the deficiency
owed by Mason on the Judgment. Second, it will resolve the issue as to the encumbrance
caused by the Kuna LID as the purchaser at foreclosure will purchase the property subject
to the Kuna LID. Once the foreclosure has taken place and th.e amount of the deficiency
determined, there will be no need for further action by the Court except as may be
necessary for execution on the deficiency judgment.

CONCLUSION
Statutes and case law set forth the procedures to be followed for the entry of a
judgment for specific performance and enforcement of said judgment. Any protections
necessary to safeguard Mason's interests are set forth in the foreclosure statutes. As such,
it is not necessary for the Court to create additional protections.

DATED this

2..7

~

day of April, 200 .

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
'j)..f

I, the ll...l1dersigned, certify that on thel1' day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING ENFORCEMENT
. OF JUDGMENT OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE to be forwarded with all required charges
prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure, to the following person(s):
Merlyn W. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

Derek A. Pica
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MAR. 2.2010

2:24PM

rflJV~.M, __- - -

NO._

r..M----~

~PR 21

2009

J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
'.

By A.l..V\<J:
oe.PUf(

Merlyn W. Cl~ ISB No. lO26

D. John Ashby) ISE No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342~3829
Email: mwc@hteh.com

jash@hteh,com

Attorneys for Defendant
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI:!E FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 1HE COtT.NTY OF ADA

F'RANKJ. FAZZJ:O, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, hU$band and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company~

Plairitiffs,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

EDWARD J, :MASON, all jndividual~

Defendant.

Case No. CV DC 080l.21S

DEFENPANrS REQUESTED
coWmO:f\iS FOR ENTRY OF THE
JODGMENT, OBJECTION TO ENTRY
OF THE JUDGMENT AW REQUEST
FOR. HEARlNG

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant Edward 1. Mason. by and through his counsel of record; Hilwley Troxell Ennis
&

Ha.wley~

lLP submits this Deftmdanfs Requested COoQitions for Entry of the Judgnlent,

Objection to Entry of the Judgment and Request for Hearing.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED CONDITIO:NS FOR ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT.
OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT Al\1J) REQUEST FOR HEARrNG - 1 -

EXHIBIT

II

4,.

· APR. 27. 2009

2: 13PM

NO. 421

I.

P.2/8

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the court is Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment) which pmportedly
l

is "in confonnance with the Memorandum Decision and Order" filed by the Collrt on December

30,2008, Mr. Mason objects to the form of the proposed judgment fu~t was submitted to the
court because it does not coufotm to the Memorandum Decision and Order, Plaintiffs have

added a provision in the submitted fonn ofju.clgmellt that jI+dgm.ent would be entered in favor of
both Pl:rintiffs and against Defenq,ant III the amount of the City of Kuna Sewer LID, which was
not pled. nor litigated, nor included in the Memorandum Decision and Order.

Mr. Mason filed a motion that the Coure s Order Granting Summary Judgment pe
certified for interlocutory appeal and the court denied thi~ motion. Mr. Mason also tiled a
motion that the court reconsider the Memorandllm Decision and Order an4 the court denied tlns
motion. How.ever, the court informed the pmties lhat in the exercise of its equi14ble powers, the

court would consider adding conditions to the ju.dgment to provide protections from injustice to
the parties, The court did not indicate what protections would be added, but rather invited. the
parties to submit suggested conclitions. By submitting a request for conditions as invited by the
court, Mr. Mason does not intend to waive his objections or his right to appeal from the Order
Gr!lllting Summary
Judgment, the decision denyipg his motion, for certification of ml
,
interlocutory appeal or the decision denying his motion for reconsideraiion.
Defendan.t requests tb.~t the court hold a hearing ou the reqlJ.ested conditions and
objection to entry of the judgment.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED CONDITIONS :eOR ENTRY OF l'HB ,JUDGMENT,
OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR HEAR.ING ~ 2 ~

APR. 27. 2009

2:14PM

II~

NO.421

P.3/8

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT

Defendant COnWl'lles to object to Plaintiffs ~ Motion for Entry of J1+4went. Defendant
also objects to Plaintiffs~ req~Jest for ajlldgment in the am01.Tllt ofthe City ofKuna Sewer LID.
Plaintiffs' Application for En1ry of Arbitration Award" or in the A.ltematiye~

COlllpl~t fOl"

Breach of Contract fails to allege any claim for ajudBlllent in favor of Plaintiffs ao.d against

Defendant in the amount ofllie City ofKuna Sewer LID. In fact, the Plaintiffs' Application

fai1s to make any reference to the City of Kuna Sewer LID. The cl~ for a judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs all4 against Defendant in the atP.Olij1t of the City oflCuna Sewer LID ha$ not been
litigated in this action. Moreover, the court's Memora:udum Decision and Order, entered herein
on December 30,2008. contains nO provision for an award to Plaintiffs and ~glUnst Defendant in
the amount oftbe City ofKuna Sewer LID. Yet) Pl;;tinfiffs have i:ncludec11angp.age in their

proposed judgment that would grant them ajudgment "in favor ofbotll Plaintiff& imd against
Defendant in the amount ofllie City ofKuna Sewer LID/'
There is no legal basis for entry of~rQchjl.l.dgment in this proceeding. The Mem.or:;wdum

Decision and Order was issued when the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. The Court cannot address this claim regarding the City ofKtma
Sewer LID because it was not raised in the pleadings and th.W3 is not sllbje~t to being a44ressed
underI.R.C.P.56(c). See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3d
733 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1184, 124 S. ct. 1426, 158 L. Ed. 2d 88 (2004)(trial cO'Q.rt
properly refused to address an em.ployee's claim regarding the employee's at-will stail.ls pecau~e

the claim. was llot raised in the pleadings and thu.s was not subject to be41g addre~~ed under
Idaho R. Civil P. 56(c)).

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED C01'-VrrrONS FOR ENTRY Op 'r}U3 JUDGMENT)
OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF.THE JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR HRA.RlNG ~ 3 -

APR. 27. 2009

2:14PM
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NO.421

fiX.

REQUESTED CONDITIONS

In their Response to Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support. Plaintiffs

assert they have a vendor's lien in their real property that is the sllbj ect of this actiop.. E,g., HI!

Fazzio were to foreclose On his vendor's lien to his real property ... :' Plaintiffs! Response p. 4.
l

Given the fact that Plaintiffs bave vendor~s liens in their property and, in effect EQ,'e foreclosing
on their liens, the legislative policies underlying the mortgage foreclosure statLJtes should guide
the court's exercise ofits equitable powers when enforcing the vendor's liens. Protections
paralleling those given mortgagors are appropri~te, and may be provided in equity, where sellers
of real property assert the existence ofvep.dor's liens. Quintana v. Anthony, 109 Idaho 977, 712
P.2d 678 (Ot. App, 1985),

In Quintana, vendors brought suit to c:ollect pll}'Il1ents clue to them. aud asserted a
vendor's lien upon the nmch. The trial court entered ju.dgI!J.ent pursuant to a stipl+lation against
the purcbaser fOT various sums Que. VendQrs deferred a foreclosure sale of the ranch and started
executing on their judgment against other assets of the purcU8;5et. Tbe PtTIcha,ser obj ected but the
trial court refused to stay the execu.tion sales. However) the Court of Appeals deten.n.ined that

the purchaser was entitled to relief from any injustice shown to result frOl1l defen.ing a
foreclosure sale of the r;mch while other property was sold at execllUon.

Specific411y~

the Court:

held that the vendor' fJ lien must be foreclosed, as provided in a jUd~ent, before the ve:p,dors
could employ other remedies against the defaultill.g purchaser.
In the C?l,Se at ~~, this is the same kind of situation th~t Defend::mt Mason seeks to E\.void.

Plaintiffs have made it pain.:fQ.lly clear that it is Plrontiff's intent to have the sheriff sell the
I

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTEP CONDITIONS.FOR Bm'RY OF THE JUDGMENT,
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2:14PM

NO.421

P.5/8

property so Plaintiffs can credit bid a 9lllall portiop of their judgment) acqllire title to the property
and proceed with the remainder of theit Ncl.gment to levy on other assets of DefendlUlt Mason.

In effect, the Plaintiffs plan to have their propmiy and their j'udgment too. This is the ldnd of
injtj.stice the Quintanna Court sought to remedy.
In Quinttmna, the COM observed. that Idaho Code § 6..101 authorizes a single form of

action to collect a debt secured by a mortgage. The mortg4ge m.ust be foreclosed. A deficiency
juclgment may be obtained if the foreclosure sale does not satisfy the debt; bJ.l.t the deficiency is
limited to the difference between the fetir market value of the real propeI1:y and the amount of the
unpaid debt. I. C. § 6-108. See Ea$tern Idaho Production Credit Maooiatton v. Pla"erton, Inc.,

100 Idaho 863,606 P.2d 967 (1980). The creditor may not simply ~ue on $e debt ~ collect by
execu.tion on the judgment. The Court stated:
Title 45 of the Idaho Code also recognize,s a vendor's lien. 'lOne who sells
re~ prop~rty has a vendor's lien thereon., independent ofpos~essiop., for so
much of the price as reinains unpaid and unsecured otherwi~e than by the
persollal obligation oftbe buyer.'! I.e. § 45-801. A ven40r l s lienl like a
mortgagep is a security device. Bu.t unJil.::e a mortgage, which arises from
agreement of the parties, a vendor's lien arises by operation oflaw, unless
waived. It is a codified creatt1l'e of equity. (Citation omitted.)
Accordingly) the vendor's lien is '~ot a specific <m.d ab~olute ch'lIge on
the realty but a mere equitable right to resort to it [i.e., the property] Oll
failure of payment by the Velldee.'~ (Citation omitted.)
In light of this distinction, we think it wou14 be 1lllwlSe to lay down a rigid

general nlle that a vendor's lien must in all respects be treated as a
mortgage. A court in eqllitymay 4etermine the scope of the lien l'J.ud how
it will be enforced in efl.ch case. Thls is especially trn,e where, as in Idaho
the statute recognizing a vendor's lien makes uo explicit provision for its
enforcement (Citation omitted..) Nevertheless, the le~isIative policies
underlying our mortgage rorecloSlJ.re statutes shoulc:J. guide the court's
exercise of it equitable powers when enforcing a vendor's lien. In
Wells v. Francis, 7 Colo. 396, 4. p. 49 (1884)~ the Colorado Supreme
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Court held that a suit on I;l. vendors lien is analogo'Q.fl to an action seeldtlg
foreclosure of a mortgage, Io.dee~ 01.11' Supreme Court. in Farnsworth 'Y.
Pepperl 27 Idaho 154} 160, 148 P.48 D 51 (915), Ms held thll-t the stamte
now coditied as I.C. § 6-101 may be applied to liem; other than mortgages.
See also Jaussaudv. Samuels, 58 Idaho 191,205,71 P,2d 426, 433
(1937)(characterizing le. §6-101 as applicable to "foreclosure of
mortgages and liens").
109 Idaho at 980, 712 P.2d at 681. (Bolel emphasis added.) The Coqrt went on to
e::qllain that Idaho Code § 6-101 was supplemented by I.C. § 6-108, the deficiency
limitation statute, during the Great Depression in response to a "hauoting spectre
of mortgage debtors defaulting on loans. losing their property in dimress sales and
encountering massive deficiencies ...." The COM stated, "In our view. PllTallel
protections are appropriate, and may be provided in eqw.ty, where sellers of re4l
property assert the existence of vendors' liens." Id.
Plaintiffs in ~s action have asserted vendor's liens in the slJ.bject
properties. Defendant Mason is requesting thill court to impose conditions
parallel to those ptovided in the mortgage foreclosure statutes of Idaho in the

judgment that is entered in f:;vor of Plaintiffs !llld against Defendant :Mason,
including:

a) Direct the sale of the enctttnbered property IUld the application of the
proceeds of the s&1~ to the p~yment of the costs of the court and the
expenses of the sale, and the amount due to the Plaintiffs, as provided in
I.e. § 6-101.
~aIe of th~ real estate under the judgment of foreclosure
is subject· to redemption as in the case of sCl1es under execution, as
provided in lC. § 6-101.

b) Order that the
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c) And if it appear from the sll.eriff s retum that the proceeda are
illr.i'uff'icient, and a. balance still remains due! ju4g:ment oan then be
docketed for such balance a.gEdns~ the Defendant, provided tb~ the amotJnt
of any d~fidency not be greater than the difference between the mortgage
indebtedness, as determined Py the decree, pl'Q.s 00$ of foreclost7te and
sale, and the reasonable value of the mortgage property, to be 4ete:nninecl
by the colJrt in the decree upon the ta,ldng of evidence of sllch valu.e, as
provided in I. C. § 6-108.
d) If there be surplus money remai!ling after payment of the judgment,
cause the l3ame to be paid to Defend~t, as provided in I.e: § 6~102.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By imposing these conditions, all parties are protected from ~ injustice th~l woulcl
otherwise result.

V.

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Defendant requests that the court hold a hearing on the req~lested conditioM an4 the
objection to entry of the ju.dgment.

DATED

nns:::?2~ay

of April. 2009.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

. Cla,tc~ ISB }fo. 1026

Attorneys for Defendant

I'
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.,'t!:-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiEi&. day of April, 2009, r ca~.sed to be served a true
copy of the foregoiIlg DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED COl\';pITIONS FOR ENTRY OF THE
JUDGMEN'l\ OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF THE TIJDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR
HEARlNG by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

__ U.S. Mail, Postnge Prepaid

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 302

~ Hand Delivered
__ Overnight :Mail

Boise, ID 83702

--Xll'elecopy - (208) 336-4980

[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

Merlyn W. Clark
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DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
BOISE,ID 83702

,j,

DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By A. GARDEN
DEPUTY

TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDA.HO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CJNDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defundant.

)
)
)
)
)
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)
)
)
)
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Case No. CV OC 0801215

MEMO~UMCL~F~G

PROPOSED JUDGMENT AS TO
KUNA LID Al"'iD OBJECTION TO
REQUEST FOR HEARING

----------------------------)
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiffs, Frank Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann
Fazzio, husband and wife, and Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, hereinafter collectively
"Fazzio," and respectfully file with the Court their Memorandum Clarifying Proposed
Judgment as to Kuna LID and Objection to Request for Hearing.
INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 2009, Defendant, Edward 1. Mason, hereinafter "Mason," filed with
the Court Defendant's Requested Conditions for Entry of the Judgment, Objection to
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Entry of the Judgment, and Request for Hearing, hereinafter "Requested Conditions." In
his Requested Conditions, Mason states that Fazzio is not entitled to a Judgment in regard
to the Kuna LID as Fazzio did not plead or request relief as to the Kuna LID. Mason
further requests a hearing on his requested conditions and objection to entry of judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.
FAZZIO DID PLEAD FOR RELIEF IN REGARD TO THE KUNA LID

In the Application for Entry of Arbitration Award, Or in the Alternative,
Complaint for Breach of Contract filed January 22,2008, Fazzio plead in part:

III.
That pursuant to the terms of the Agreements entered into by Plaintiffs
and Defendant, Edward J. Mason, Plaintiffs are entitled to the remedy of
specific performance enforcing the terms of the Agreements as a result of
Defendant, Edward J. Mason, breaching the Agreements by failing to close
his purchase of the real property that is the subject matter of the
Agreements. (Emphasis added).
Application for Entry of Arbitration Award, Or in the Alternative, Complaint for Breach
of Contract filed January 22,2008, p. 6. Paragraph 4 of the Agreements entered into
between Fazzio and Mason provides:
4. LOCAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT: Mason shall be
responsible for and pay any assessments that become due and owing to the
city ofKuna prior to closing as a result of Mason causing the Subject
Property to be subject to the local improvement district, hereinafter
"L.l.D." in May of2006.
Agreements to Resolve Dispute Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement
Dated April 12,2006 So as to A void Arbitration, p. 3. Clearly Fazzio plead that Mason
be required to specifically perform all provisions of the Agreements, including paying the
MEMORANDUM CLARIFYING PROPOSED JUDGMENT AS TO KUNA LID AND OBJECTION
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Kuna LID. Obviously, if Mason completes the purchase of Fazzio's real property, the
issue relating to the KlLl1a LID is moot if the purchase takes place prior to any
assessments coming due. Further, if the property is sole at a foreclosure sale prior to the
assessments coming due, the LID issue will also be moot. However, UIltil Mason
completes his purchase, or the property is sold, Mason should be required to specifically
perform and judgment should be entered regarding the Kuna LID assessment.

II.
FAZZIO OBJECTS TO ANY FURTHER HEARINGS AS TO THE
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Mason requests yet another hearing in regard to his objection to entry of
judgment. This is nothing more than a further delay tactic on the part of Mason. Mason's
counsel made it perfectly clear at the hearing on April 15,2009 that Mason was seeking
to avoid having a judgment entered so as to avoid the cost of a supersedeous bond to
prevent execution on the judgment while he appealed. He has already managed to delay
entry of a judgment by filing an illegitimate appeal, which was ultimately dismissed.
This Court stated at the hearing on April 15, 2009 that it intended to enter a
judgment for the purchase price plus interest. The Court wanted guidance in regard to
Mason's concerns that Fazzio could ultimately end up with a judgment for the purchase
price and the real property as well. Both parties have provided very similar briefmg on
this issue. As such, there is nothing further that can be accomplished at a hearing other
than further delay and additional costs. A hearing may be appropriate as to the Court's
proposed judgment, but until a proposed judgment is issued by the Court, no hearing is
necessary.
MEMORANDUM CLARIFYING PROPOSED JlJDGMENT AS TO KUNA LID AND OBJECTION
TO REQUEST FOR HEARING - Page 3

CONCLUSION
Fazzio requests that the Court enter judgment as stated at the April 15,2009
hearing, with Fazzio being given the opportunity to accept the judgment or proceed on
damages.
~

DATED this ~ day of May, 2009.

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, certify that on the t{ ~ day of May, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM CLARIFYING PROPOSED JUDGMENT AS TO
KUNA LID AND OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR HEARING to be forwarded with all required
charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure, to the follov.7ffig person(s):
Merlyn W. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail
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FILED
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MAY 28 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICfYdf.NN~;~ENNEDY
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANKJ. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0801215
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT

vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

After this matter was argued on the pending motions, the Court offered the parties the
opportunity to suggest limitations to be placed upon any judgment entered pursuant to the
previous summary judgment motion. The parties have submitted supplemental memoranda and
the matter was taken under advisement as of May 5,2009. Included in the memoranda was a
request by the defendant for a hearing prior to entry of judgment.
The Court denies the request for hearing and directs the entry of judgment without nuiher
hearing in this matter. The Court detennines that further argument will not materially aid the
Court in its decision.
Having considered the files and records in this matter, including the previous decision
entered on summary judgment by Judge Sticklen, the comments and briefs of counsel, the Court
has detennined the following:

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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EXHIBIT
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1. This action is an action in equity for a specific perfonnance. The remedy of specific
performance was granted, with an alternative remedy for entry of a summary judgment.
2. It would be inherently inequitable for a money judgment to be entered for the full
balance due on the purchase price without recognizing the value of the real property that is the
subject ofthe dispute between the parties. The Court has therefore detennined that, while a
judgment for the full purchase price is appropriate, it is also appropriate to give the judgment
debtor the benefit of the value ofthe real property that is the subject of this dispute. For that
reason, the Court accepts the invitation of both parties and will enter a judgment providing for
vendors liens to secure the jUdgments entered in favor of plaintiffs. The Court further intends to
authorize sale of the real property under execution to enforce the judgments. Such sale is to be
conducted in accordance with the procedures on execution sale in mortgage foreclosures. In this
fashion the plaintiffs will receive the benefit of the value of the property, as well as the benefit of
their contract. The defendant will be protected from an unreasonably low sales price at execution
by the anti-deficiency statutes together with the right ofredemption.
The plaintiff has asked that the amount due on the Local Improvement District (LID) be
included in the judgment. The Court declines to do so. However, the Court finds that it is
necessary to account for the LID in fashioning and remedying this case. For that reason the
Judgment and Decree ofthe Court will provide that the vendor's liens are subject to the LID. In
this fashion, should the property be sold to enforce the vendor's lien, plaintiffs will not have the
value oftheir bargain reduced by the amount of the LID. It would be inherently inequitable to
require the defendant to pay the LID on the property as part of a money judgment. It is also

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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inequitable to require plaintiffs to bear the burden of the LID when defendant agreed to be
responsible for the same. Because record title to the property currently remains in the plaintiffs,
they are presumably being billed for the LID. For that reason the Judgment and Decree will
provide for recovery of any actual LID payments made by defendants at anytime prior to sale of
the property and satisfaction ofthe vendor's lien or defendant otherwise satisfying the judgments.
The Court will enter a separate judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

~ ~ day of May 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

~ day of May 2009, I mailed a true and correct copy of
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DEREK A PICA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N CAPITOL BLVD STE 302
BOISE IDAHO 83702

MERLYN W CLARK
DJOHNASHBY
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS
& HAWLEY LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 1617
BOISE IDAHO 83701-1617
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By JENNIFER KENNEDY
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,

Case No. CV-OC-0801215
JTJDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.
On December 30, 2008, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order in the
above action granting plaintiffs specific performance of plaintiffs , contract with defendant
requiring defendant to complete the purchase of plaintiffs' real property and otherwise
specifically perform the contract between the parties. Defendant was given thirty days from
December 30, 2008 to perform. Defendant having failed to pay the balance due under the terms
of the parties' contract, consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order of
December 30, 2008, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. Judgment is hereby entered against Defendant Edward J. Mason in favor of Plaintiffs

Frank I. Fazzio, Ir. and Cindy Ann Fazzio in the principal amount of$I,530,000.00, plus interest
thereon calculated at the rate of 12% per annum, in the amount of$412,471.08.

JUDGMENT - PAGE 1
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2. Judgment is hereby entered against Defendant Edward J. Mason in favor of Plaintiff
Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, in the principal amount of $2,000,000.00, together with interest
thereon calculated at the rate of 12% per annum in the amount of$539,177.66.
3. To secure the Judgment entered herein, plaintiffs shall each be granted a vendor's lien
as set forth below:
a. Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio are hereby declared to have a valid,
subsisting vendor's lien against real property that is the subject of the contract with
defendant, more particularly described as follows: The Northwest Quarter ofthe
Northwest Quarter of Section 14, township 2 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian,
Ada County Idaho, as shown on Record of Survey No. 2531, filed as instrument
9367500, in the records of the office of the Ada County Recorder.
b. PlaintiffIdaho Livestock Company, LLC is hereby declared to have a valid,
subsisting lien upon the real property which is the subject of the contract with
defendant, which real property is more particularly described as follow:
PARCELL:
Lot 2, block 1 according to the official plat thereof filed in Book 70 of plats at pg.
7150, records ofthe Ada County Recorder.
PARCEL II:
South Y2 of Northwest ~, Section 14, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Boise
Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
4. The vendor's liens herein declared are subordinate and inferior to all assessments
due, and to become due, owing to the City of Kuna by virtue of the Local Improvement
District established by the City ofKuna in May 2006.
JUDGMENT - PAGE 2

5. Upon satisfaction ofthe Judgments entered herein, in full, defendant shall be
entitled to transfer oftitle to the real property above described as provided in the contract
between the parties, so long as the property has not been sold in satisfaction of the vendor's
lien herein declared. Subject, however, to the requirement that defendant shall reimburse
plaintiffs any sums actually paid by plaintiffs representing charges and assessments of the
Local Improvement District created by the City of Kuna in May 2006.
6. The vendor's lien herein declared may be enforced through sale of the real property
in the same manner and subject to the same restrictions as the execution sale of property
subject to a decree of foreclosure as set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code.
7. As part of any execution sale the foreclosing judgment creditor herein shall be
entitled to recover all sums actually paid to the City ofKuna as assessments and charges for
the Local Improvement District which have been actually paid by the judgment creditor prior
to sale. Such sum shall be collected from the proceeds of sale and repayed to the judgment
creditor prior to the application of the proceeds of sale to the judgment granted above.
8. The Judgments herein granted shall bear interest at statutory rate of 7.625% per
annum from the date of Judgment until paid.
9. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce this decree and resolve any disputes
arising from this decree.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

;2. &Yday of May 2009.
eenwood
District Judge
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LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
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vs.
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Case No . CV OC 0801215
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
DISALLOW PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
FEES AND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND FEES

Plaintiffs, Frank J. Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio and Idaho Livestock
Company, LLC, respectfully file with the Court their Memorandum in Response to
Defendant's Second Objection and Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs
and Fees and Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 22, 2008, Plaintiffs, Frank J . Fazzio, Jr . and Cindy Ann Fazzio

and Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, hereinafter collectively "Fazzio," filed their
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
DISALLOW PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES AND AMENDED
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Application for Entry of Arbitration Award, Or in the Alternative, Complaint for Breach
of Contract.
2.

On February 19,2008, Fazzio served on Defendant's counsel Plaintiff's

First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Defendant.
3.

On March 24, 2008, Defendant, Edward J. Mason, hereinafter "Mason,"

served on Fazzio's counsel Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories
and Responses to Request for Production of Documents to Defendant which stated that
the majority of the discovery requested would be produced pursuant to an appropriate
protective order. (Affidavit in Support of Motion to Compel filed April 7,2008).
4.

On April 7, 2008, Fazzio filed a Motion to Compel Mason's responses to

discovery.
5.

On or about May 1,2008, Mason filed his Motion for Protective Order.

6.

On June 6, 2008, the Court filed its Order on Motion to Compel and

Motion for Protective Order.
7.

On August 4, 2008, Fazzio filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along

with a supporting Memorandum and Affidavit.
8.

On October 7, 2008, Mason filed his Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment.
9.

On October 21,2008, a hearing was held on Fazzio's Motion for Summary

Judgment, at which time the Court requested supplemental briefing on certain issues.
10.

On November 4,2009, both Fazzio and Mason filed their supplemental

briefing.
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11.

On December 30, 2008, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and

Order granting Fazzio summary judgment as to Fazzio's breach of contract claim and
granted Fazzio specific performance by giving Mason thirty (30) days to perform on the
contracts he had entered into with Fazzio or the Court would enter judgment for the
purchase price.
12.

On January 13,2009, Fazzio filed a Memorandum of Costs seeking costs

and attorney's fees in the amount of$31,228.00.
13.

On January 20,2009, Mason, despite the fact that the district court had not

entered a fmal judgment, flied a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
14.

On January 26,2009, Mason filed Defendant's Objection and Motion to

Disallow Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Fees.
15.

On February 11,2009, Fazzio filed a Motion to Dismiss and Supporting

Memorandum to the Supreme Court arguing that Mason's appeal should be dismissed as
the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 30, 2008 is not an
appealable decision.
16.

On February 23,2009, Mason filed his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.

17.

On February 24, 2009, Fazzio filed his Response to Opposition to Motion

to Dismiss.
18.

On March 23, 2009, the Supreme Court filed its Order Conditionally

Dismissing Appeal. (See Appendix 1).
19.

On March 27,2009, Mason filed a Request for Certification for

Interlocutory Appeal.
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20.

On April 3, 2009, Fazzio filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and an

Objection to Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal.
21.

On April 7,2009 Mason filed a Motion for Reconsideration and

Memorandum in Support.
22.

On May 28,2009, after receiving Supplemental Memorandums from both

parties, the district court filed its Judgment granting Fazzio a Judgment against Mason for
the full purchase price of the contracts and a vendor's lien against the subject real
property.
23.

On June 4, 2009, Fazzio filed an Amended Memorandum of Costs.

24.

On June 17,2009, Mason filed Defendant's Second Objection and Motion

to Disallow Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Fees and Amended Memorandum of
Costs and Fees.
25.

Paragraph 14 of the Agreement to Resolve Dispute Arising Out of Real

Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated April 12, 2006 So As to Avoid Arbitration
entered into by Fazzio and Mason states:
14. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO ENFORCE THIS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: Should either party be required to bring
an action or apply to the district court to obtain a judgment to enforce this
Settlement Agreement, that party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney
fees and costs associated with that action or application.
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ARGUMENT

I.
MASON'S ARGUMENT THAT ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE DENIED
AS A RESULT OF FAZZIO'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
INFORMATION IS MISPLACED.
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) provides:

Rule 54(e)(3). Amount of attorney fees.
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil
action it shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of
such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field oflaw.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of
the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(J) A wards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in
preparing a party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.
Mason is taking the position that because Fazzio has not provided information relating to
all of the factors set forth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3), Fazzio's attorney's fees claim should be
denied. What Mason fails to recognize is the fact that the factors set forth in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) go solely to the amount of attorney's fees awarded, not to whether the Court
should grant attorney's fees. Second, I.R.C.P. 54(3)(6) provides that the Court may
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conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.

In an effort to avoid an evidentiary hearing, Fazzio's counsel has submitted a
Supplemental Affidavit to Determine Amount of Attorney's Fees.

II.
THE TIME AND LABOR REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFFS IS NOT UNREASONABLE
Mason argues the time and labor spent by Fazzio's counsel was unreasonable and
therefore, certain fees should be disallowed. First among Mason's objections is the fact
that attorney's fees are being requested for a Motion to Compel brought by Fazzio.
Mason's position is that the Motion to Compel was premature. The Court records show
that Mason did not file a Motion For a Protective Order until several weeks after Fazzio
filed their Motion to Compel. Mason also complains that Fazzio objected to the request
for protective order. The Court records show that the protection order that was entered is
far different than the protective order requested by Mason. All attorney fees incurred by
Fazzio in regarding to the Motion to Compel and the protective order were reasonable
and necessary.
Mason also objects to time entries for the dates of 1/03/08 and 1/04/08 relating to
the drafting of proposed agreements to avoid the necessity oflitigation. Given the
outcome of the litigation, Mason would have been well advised to accept Fazzio's
proposed settlement. Clearly, Fazzio's efforts to avoid litigation relate to the lawsuit.
Had Mason complied with the contracts he entered into, such efforts on Fazzio's part
would not have been necessary.
Mason also objects to the attorney's fees relating to Fazzio's objection to the
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
DISALLOW PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES AND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - Page 6

appeal that was filed by Mason over which the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction as
Mason was attempting to appeal an interlocutory order. The attorney's fees incurred by
Fazzio are certainly covered by the attorney's fees provision in the Agreements to
Resolve Dispute Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sal Agreement Dated April 12,
2006 So As to Avoid Arbitration.
Further, the district court has continuing jurisdiction over all matters, including
attorney's fees. In Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (App. 1984), the
Idaho Court of Appeals held:
An appeal taken from a nonappealable order does not divest the lower
court of continuing jurisdiction in the case. See Marks v. Vehlow, 105
Idaho 560, 567, 671 P.2d 473, 480 (1983).
107 Idaho at 880. The district court clearly has jurisdiction over all attorney's fees issues
until such time as a [mal judgment was filed.
CONCLUSION
Fazzio is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of$51,367.50 and
costs in the amount of $88.00.

DATED this

'-I I'd day of August, 20

9.

/L

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

"INday of August, 2009, I caused a true
I, the undersigned, certify that on the _,_
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO DISALLOW PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES
AND AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES to be forwarded with all required
charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure, to the following person(s):
Merlyn W. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
FRAW< J. FAZZIO, JR, and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife. anti IDAHO
L~STOCK. COMPANY.

IL9.

Plaintiffs-Respondents~

)
)

)
)
)
-)

)

v.

ORDER CONDITIONALLY
DISMISSING APPEAL
S1tpteme Co'Qrt Docket 'No. 36068-2009
Ada. County Dis1:rict Co1.lrtNQ. 2008~1215

)

EDWARD J, MASON,

all individual,

Defendst-Appellmt.

)

Ref. No. 09S..80

)
)

,A MOTION TO DISMISS, an AFFIDA"VIT
,
.OF DEREK. PICA mSUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISlv.1ISS with attachment an4 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

TO DIS:MJSS with

atta.chment were filed by counsel for Respondents on Febl'llal'Y 12, 2009~ requestin~

this Court for an

Order dismissing the above entitled. appeal on the grounds that the Memoran4um Decision !Uld Order
that Respo:udent is appealing from is an interlocutory order and. is not an appealable

order~

pursuant to

Rule ll(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. Thereafter, an opPOSmoN TO MOTlON TO DISMISS

was filed by counsel

~or

Appellant on February 23. 2009.

Subseqqendy. a RESPONSE TO

oPPOSmON TO MOT~ON TO DISMISS was ti16Cl by counsel for Re~o:tJdents on Febru.a:ry 24, 2009.
The Court is fully advis¢d; therefore, good ca:qse appe!Ping,

IT EEREBY IS ORDERED that the above entitle4 appef\l bel M4 hereby is,
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSED unless a SEPARATE runGMEN!' IS FILED PURSUANT TO
lC.R'S8(a) OR A PERMISSIVE APPEAL IS PROCURED WJ.TIIm THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM
THE DATE OF THIS ORDER.

rr FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceecllngs in this ~pe:u be, and'hereby are. SUSPENDED
until further Order of this Court

DATED this

2-3

day of March. 2009.
By Or4er of the SQpreme Dorm

Stephen W. Kenyon
co:

ler]c

Counsel of Record

, District Court Clerk
District J'\ldge Kathryn A. StickIeo.
ORO

CONDITIONALLY DISMISSlliO APPEAL - Docket Nd. 36068-2009

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna ID 83634

In Reference To:

Fazzio/Idaho Livestock v. Mason

Amount
Previous balance
9/2/08 Payment - thank you

$2,828.95
($2,828.95)

Balance due

$0.00

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna ID 83634

In Reference To:
Invoice # 21196

Fazzio/Idaho Livestock v. Mason

Professional services
Hours

Amount

9/25/08 Review settlement E-mail from client and
analyze; review Summary Judgment issues
as pertains to settlement

0.60

135.00

10/8/08 Review Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and analyze; review Affidavit of Edward
J. Mason in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and analyze;
review supplemental discovery responses

4.40

990.00

10/10/08 Research specific performance issues;
draft letter to client

1. 60

360.00

10/13/08 Research equity issues; review cases
cited by defendant; draft Memorandum in
Response to Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

9.50

2,137.50

10/14/08 Draft Affidavit; research arbitration
issue; complete draft of Response
Memorandum

3.60

810.00

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page

2

Hours

Amount

10/lS/08 Review defendant's 2007 income tax
returns; draft Second Affidavit; draft
letter to client

1. 60

360.00

10/20/08 Prepare for hearng

1. 30

292.50

10/21/08 Continue preparation for Summary
Judgment Hearing; attend Summary
Judgment Hearing; conference with client

4.00

900.00

10/22/08 Draft Motion to Amend Complaint; draft
Amended Application and Complaint; draft
Motion to Extend Time; research
impossibility of performance issues

5.70

1,282.S0

10/23/08 Research specific performance issues at
Law Library

2.00

450.00

For professional services rendered

34.30 $7,717.S0

Additional charges:
10/22/08 Postage
Copies
Total costs

4.42
7S.60
$80.02

Total amount of this bill

$7,797.52

Balance due

$7,797.S2

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2008

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page

ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.
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DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna ID 83634

In Reference To:
Invoice # 21261

Fazzio/Idaho Livestock v. Mason

Professional services
Hours

Amount

10/24/08 Continue research on specific
performance and damage issues

3.20

720.00

10/29/08 Research specific performance
enforcement issues

3.00

675.00

10/30/08 Research specific performance issues;
continue draft of Supplemental
Memorandum; research damages issue;
complete research on impossibility of
performance issue

4.80

1,080.00

10/31/08 Research damages issue in specific
performance case; complete draft of
Supplemental Memorandum; draft Affidavit

3.60

810.00

4.70

1,057.50

11/3/08 Conduct additional research on
enforcement of judgment for specific
performance; draft Revised Memorandum

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page

2

Hours

Amount

11/4/08 Complete draft of Revised Memorandum;
review Defendant's Supplemental
Memorandum and analyze; research cases
cited by Defendant; draft letter to
client

3.50

787.50

11/5/08 Continue research of specific
performance issues raised in Defendant's
Brief; draft Affidavit of client

2.70

607.50

11/6/08 Telephone conference with Larry Braga
regarding tax issue; research issue
regarding use of judgment as credit;
draft letter to client

2.60

585.00

11/7/08 Continue researching specific
performance enforcement issues

0.80

180.00

0.30

67.50

11/10/08 Draft Notice of Hearing; review Court
dates to determine discovery schedule
For professional services rendered

29.20 $6,570.00

Additional charges:
11/24/08 Postage
Copies
Total costs

7.91
16.95
$24.86

Total amount of this bill

$6,594.86

Previous balance

$7,797.52

11/3/08 Payment - thank you

($7,797.52)

Balance due

$6,594.86

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH NOVEMBER 24, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH NOVEMBER 25, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.
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DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna ID 83634

In Reference To:

Fazzio/Idaho Livestock v. Mason

Amount
Previous balance
12/22/08 Payment - thank you

$6,594.86
($6,594.86)

Balance due

$0.00

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH DECEMBER 26, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH DECEMBER 26, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna ID 83634

In Reference To:
Invoice # 21401

Fazzio/Idaho Livestock v. Mason

Professional services
Hours

Amount

1/2/09 Review Memorandum Decision and Order and
analyze; draft letter to client

1. 40

315.00

1/6/09 Review contracts; calculate attorney
fees; draft Memorandum of Cost and
Affidavit of Attorney Fees; calculate
interest due and owing

1. 70

382.50

1/8/09 Finalize Memorandum of Costs; draft
Affidavit of Attorney Fees

1. 00

225.00

1/13/09 Review Notice; draft letter to client

0.20

45.00

1/21/09 Review Notice of Appeal and analyze;
research enforcement and bond issues;
research finality issue; draft Motion to
Dismiss; draft Request for Additional
Documents; draft letter to client

3.20

720.00

For professional services rendered

7.50 $1,687.50

/"

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
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Additional charges:
Amount
1/21/09 Postage
Copies
Total costs

5.97
14.10
$20.07

Total amount of this bill

$1,707.57

Balance due

$1,707.57

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JANUARY 22, 2009
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH JANUARY 22, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna ID 83634

In Reference To:
Invoice #21472

Fazzio/Idaho Livestock v. Mason

Professional services
Hours

Amount

1/29/09 Review Objection to Motion to Dismiss;
research jurisdiction of lower court of
an improper appeal; research specific
performance orders as to finality

1. 70

382.50

v

2/9/09 Research interlocutory judgment issues;
draft Motion to Dismiss in Supreme
Court; begin draft of supporting
Memorandum

2.50

562.50

~

2/10/09 Continue draft of Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss; research specific
performance judgment issues

3.70

832.50/

2/11/09 Complete draft of Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss; draft Affidavit in Support of
Motion to Dismiss; draft letter to
client; analyze objection to costs and
fees

4.30

967.50 ~

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page
Hours

2/23/09 Review opposition to Motion to Dismiss
and analyze; research case law cited by
appellant and analyze; telephone
conference with Stephan Kenyon at
Supreme Court; research jurisdictional
issues
For professional services rendered

2

Amount

2.40

540.00/

14.60 $3,285.00

Additional charges:
2/20/09 Postage

3.19

Copies

31. 20

Total costs

$34.39

Total amount of this bill

$3,319.39

Previous balance

$1,707.57

2/2/09 Payment - thank you

($1,707.57)

Balance due

$3,319.39

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH FEBRUARY 23, 2009
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH FEBRUARY 23, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazziolldaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna, ID 83634

March 30, 2009
In Reference To:

Fazziolldaho Livestock v. Mason

Invoice #10014

Professional Services
Hrs/Rate

Amount

2/24/2009 Research "finality" issues; continue draft of Reply to Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss; draft letter to client

3.30
225.00/hr

742.50

3/16/2009 Review Clerk's Record on Appeal; draft Request for Addition; draft letter to
Merlyn Clark

1.70
225.00/hr

382.50

For professional services rendered

5.00

$1,125.00

Additional Charges:
3/23/2009 Postage

Copying cost
Total additional charges
Total amount of this bill

3.62
10.50
$14.12
$1,139.12

Accounts receivable transactions
3/412009 Payment - Thank You
3/28/2009 Starting balance

Balance due

($3,319.39)
$3,319.39
$1,139.12

~

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional seNices rendered through March 23, 2009
Payments received through March 27, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.
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DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazziolldaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna, ID 83634

April 27, 2009
In Reference To:

Fazziolldaho Livestock v. Mason

Invoice #10079

Professional Services
HrslRate

Amount

3/24/2009 Review Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal and analyze; review I.R.C.P.
58(a); draft letter to client; telephone conference with Richard Webber

0.80
225.00/hr

180.00

V

3/27/2009 Telephone conference with Richard Webber; review request for certification of
interlocutory appeal and analyze

1.40
225.00/hr

315.00

V

3/29/2009 Research permissive appeal issues

1.30
225.00/hr

292.50

V

3/30/2009 Draft letter to client; continue research as to requirements for interlocutory
appeal

0.70
225.00/hr

157.50/

3/31/2009 Draft Objection; draft Affidavit of client; begin draft of Memorandum in Support
of Objection

7.50
225.00/hr

1,687.50

4/1/2009 Continue draft of Memorandum in Support of Objection

2.80
225.00/hr

630.00

~

4/2/2009 Review E-mail from client; revise draft of Objection

0.80
225.00/hr

180.00

V'

4/3/2009 Revise draft of Memorandum in Support of Objection; draft Motion for Entry of
Judgment; draft Judgment

2.50
225.00/hr

562.50~

4/6/2009 Telephone conference with Court Clerk; draft Notice of Hearing; draft letter to
client; research judgment interest issue

1.30
225.00/hr

292.50

4/7/2009 Review Motion for Reconsideration and analyze; review supporting Affidavit;
research issues raised by Motion; draft Motion to Strike and supporting Affidavit;
draft letter to client

2.30
225.00/hr

517.50

/

Page

Frank Fazziolldaho Livestock

HrslRate
4/13/2009 Review client's E-mail and analyze; review briefing; research "impossibility"

issue raised by Mason; prepare for Hearing
4/14/2009 Continue research of reconsideration issues; draft Memorandum in Opposition

to Motion for Reconsideration

2

Amount

3.60
225.00/hr

810.00

4.40

990.00

225.00/hr

4/15/2009 Complete draft of Memorandum; prepare for Hearing; attend Hearing

4.80
225.00/hr

1,080.00

4/16/2009 Review E-mails from client and analyze; research vendor lien issues

2.80
225.00/hr

630.00

1.70
225.00/hr

382.50 V'

2.40

540.00 V'"

'I.

4/17/2009 Draft letter to client; draft letter to John Thornton; continue research on

foreclosure of Vendor's Lien
)('
4/20/2009 Finalize letter to Mr. Thornton; telephone conferences with Richard Webber;
research foreclosure issues

A'

X

4/21/2009 Telephone conference with Richard Webber; telephone conference with John

Thornton; prepare documents for Mr. Thornton; work on Judgment issues
4/22/2009

Continue research as to foreclosure and redemption issues

4/23/2009 Continue research as to terms in a judgment for specific performance; begin

draft of Supplemental Memorandum; telephone conference with Merlyn Clark
For professional services rendered

225.00/hr

1.40

315.00

225.00/hr

2.20
225.00/hr

495.00

6.70
225.00/hr

1,507.50

51.40

$11,565.00

Additional Charges:
4/23/2009 Postage

Copying cost
Total additional charges
Total amount of this bill
Previous balance

10.60
21.30
$31.90
$11,596.90
$1,139.12

Accounts receivable transactions
4/612009 Payment - Thank You

($1,139.12)

Total payments and adjustments

($1,139.12)

Balance due

$11,596.90

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock
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VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional services rendered through April 23,2009
Payments received through April 24, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.
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DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Frank Fazziolldaho Livestock
2802 Ten Mile Rd
Kuna, ID 83634

May 26, 2009
In Reference To:

Fazziolldaho Livestock v. Mason

Invoice #10144

Professional Services

4/24/2009 Complete draft of Supplemental Memorandum; review tax opinion

/

HrslRate
3.70

Amount
832.50/

225.00/hr
4/27/2009 Finalize Memorandum

0.60

135.00

225.00/hr
4/28/2009 Review Defendant's Requested Conditions for Entry of the Judgment, Objection

to Entry of the Judgment and Request for Hearing and analyze; draft letter to
client
5/112009 Review file as to pleadings; draft Memorandum Clarifying Proposed Judgment

as to Kuna LID and Objection to Request for Hearing
5/4/2009 Finalize Memorandum

0.80

180.00

225.00/hr

2.80

630.00

225.00/hr

0.40

90.00

225.00/hr

For professional services rendered

8.30

$1,867.50

Additional Charges:
5/21/2009 Postage

Copying cost
Total additional charges
Total amount of this bill
Previous balance

3.62
7.80
$11.42
$1,878.92
$11,596.90

Frank Fazzio/Idaho Livestock

Page

2

Amount
Accounts receivable transactions

5/6/2009 Payment - Thank You
Total payments and adjustments
Balance due

($11,596.90)
($11,596.90)
$1,878.92

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional services rendered through May 21, 2009
Payments received through May 22,2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.

:;E

a: z
0ce.

U-:::>
Zt-

OW
<...)0:

Wo
(/)z

UJ<t:

-I

Cl...

Merlyn W Clark, ISB No 1026
D John Ashby, ISB No 7228
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
PO, Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: mwc@htehcom
jash@hteh com
Attorneys for Def~mdant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

FRANK J FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,

)
)

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
vs

)
)
)

EDW ARD J MASON, an individual,
Defendant

Case No, CV OC 0801215
DEFENDANT'S SECOND OBJECTION
AND MOTION TO DISALLOW
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND FEES AND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
FEES

)
)
)

------------------------------

Defendant Edward J Mason, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP, submits this Second Memorandum and Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs'

Memorandum of Costs and Fees and Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees

DEFENDANT'S SECOND OBJECTION AND MOTION TO DISALLOW
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES AND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 1
434640001 15734171

I. INTRODUCTION
On or about January 13, 2009, Plaintiffs filed herein their Memorandum of Costs and
Affidavit of Attorney Fees Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On
or about January 26,2009, Defendant filed herein Defendant's Objection and Motion to
Disallow Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Fees The claim for fees and costs was never
heard or decided by the court.
Plaintiffs have now filed an Amended Memorandum of Costs and Amended Affidavit of
Attorney Fees Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(5) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an award
of attorney fees and costs that reaches back to the beginning ofthis action. The claim for an
award of attorney fees is defective and cannot be granted

n,
A.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees Must be Denied For Failure to Provide the
Court With Suflicient Information From Which to Determine the Reasonableness of
the Amount Claimed.
As is pointed out in Defendants' first Objection and Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs'

Memorandum of Costs and Fees, in determining a reasonable attorney fee award, the Court must
consider all ofthe factors listed in I Rep 54(e)(3) Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,435,
III PJd 110, 120 (2005)("Lettunich I"); Heinz v Heinz, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P 2d 20, 28

(1997). Although, some of the information may come Hom the Court's own knowledge and
experience and some may come from the record in the case, some can only be supplied by the
party Id; Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc v. Texas Refinery Corp, 139 Idaho 761, 86 PJd 475
(2004)(award of attorney fees vacated where prevailing party did not provide the trial court with
sufficient information from which to determine the reasonableness ofthe amount claimed) The
factors to determine the reasonableness of an attorney fee award include: time and labor,
DEFENDANT'S SECOND OBJECTION AND MOTION TO DISALLOW
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES AND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 2
43464 0001 1573417 1

difficulty, skill required, prevailing charges, fixed or contingent fee, time limitations, amount and
result, undesirability ofthe case, relationship with the client, awards in similar cases, costs of
automated research and any other factors. ld, citing I R. CP. 54( e)(3). It is incumbent upon the
party seeking the fees to provide the necessary information Id.
Plaintiffs' first MemOIandum of Costs and the Affidavit of Attomey Fees submitted in
support thereof and Plaintiffs' Amended Memorandum of Costs and Amended Affidavit of
Attorney Fees both fail to satisfy Plaintiffs' burden under Rule 54(e)(3). Plaintiffs simply submit
their attorney's Affidavits containing their attomey's billing recOIds, which pmpOItedly relate to
this action, together with his statements in both Affidavits that he billed Plaintiffs at a fixed
hourly rate of $225.00 and his conclusory statements that "said rates are consistent with the
prevailing charges for like work in the State of Idaho by attorneys with comparable experience,"
and that the time and labor spent by their attorney was necessary for the proper prosecution of
Plaintiffs' action. No other information is provided that would allow the court to consider all of
the factors the comt is required to consider under Rule 54(e)(3)..
It is incumbent upon a party seeking attomey fees to present sufficient information for the
court to consider the factors as they specificaI1y relate to the prevailing party or parties seeking
fees

Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 706 P2d 1372 (Ct App . 1985) Plaintiffs have failed

to do so . For this reason alone, Plaintiffs' claim for an award of attomey fees must be denied
Lettunich v Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, 111 P 3d 110, 120 (2005)

B.

The Time and Labor Requested by Plaintiffs is Unreasonable.
The time and labor actually expended by an attomey is to be considered under I Rep

S4(e)(3)(A), but it is also to be evaluated under a standard ofreasonab1eness Daisy

Manufacturing Co, Inc. v Paintball Sports, Inc, 134 Idaho 249, 263,999 P2d 914 CCt App.
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2000). "A court is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by
the attomey under IRCP S4(e)(3)(A) and need not bHndly accept the figures advanced by the
attorney." Id. (quoting Craft Wall oj Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebreaker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P 2d
324,326 (Ct App. 1985». Thus, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily and
unreasonably incurred Id
Plaintiffs have included in the time records submitted in support of their request for fees,
time spent by their attorney to pursue a motion to compel Defendant to comply with discovery
requests for financial and other personal infoImation of Defendant, when Defendant had
previously responded that the information would be produced after the court entered an order to
protect such information from public disclosure and misuse by Plaintiffs outside the scope and
course of the litigation The court's records will also show that PlaintiffS further objected to
Defendant's motion for entry of a protective order to prevent the public disclosure and misuse of
such information by Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' motion to compel was premature and unnecessary and
their objection to the Defendant's motion for a protective order to allow the discovery to occur
was without any basis in fact or law. The protective order was entered and the information was
produced as promised. There simply was no need for the motion to compel or the objection to a
protective order. Thus, Plaintiffs' claim for an award of attorney fees for such unneceSSaIY and
unreasonable actions should be denied.
The failure of Plaintiffs' counsel to adequately identify and itemize the tasks performed
and the issues or matters relevant to those tasks, and particularly the "block billing" contained in
the monthly biI1ing invoices that have been submitted to the court, make it impossible to
apportion the time and labor relating to the motion to compel and the objection to the protective
order Thus, Defendant objects to any award ofattomey fees for the time and labor shown on the
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invoices for the dates, Apri13 and 8, May 8,9, 13, 19 and 21, 2008, all of which appear to relate
to the unnecessary motion to compel and the objection to the motion for protective order. The
total time for those dates is 9 8 hours and the dollar amount is $2,205 00 at $225 per hour.
Additionally, there are entries in the billing invoices for time and labor spent on matters
that do not relate to prosecution ofthe lawsuit. The entries are:
113/08 "Review Agreements to resolve dispute; draft Extension Agreements for

client and Idaho Livestock 450 hours $1,01250;"
114/08 "Revise drafts of Agreements; draft letter to Merlyn Clark 2 00 hours

$450.00;"
Drafting Extension Agreements was not part of the prosecution of the lawsuit Additional
umelated entries are:
1/16/08 "Review Agr eements relating to ditch issues 040 hours $90 00;"
1117/08 "Draft letter to Merlyn Clark 040 hours $90.00;"

A review ofthe court's records in this lawsuit wilJ establish there were no "ditch issues" in this
action to enforce two purchase contracts An additional umelated entry is:
7/2/08, "Review letter client drafts regarding berm and revise; review letters flom
Ted Mason 1.00 hour $225 "

A review of the court's records in this lawsuit will establish there was no "berm" issue in
this action The total time for all ofthese unrelated entries is 8 J hours

OI

$1,86750

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have included in their claim for attorney fees to be awarded in this
action, all of the time that was spent by their attorney to resist the Appeal in the Supreme Court
These entries are:
1/1.3/09 "Review Notice; draft letter to client 0.20 hours $45 00;"
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1121109 "Review Notice of Appeal and analyze; research enforcement and bond
issues; research finality issue; draft Motion to Dismiss; draft Request for
Additional Documents; draft letter to client 3.20 hours $720 00;"
1129109 "Review Oqjection to Motion to Dismiss; research jurisdiction of lower
court of an improper appeal; research specific performance orders as to
finality 1 70 hours $38250;"
2/9109 "Research interlocutory judgment issues; draft Motion to Dismiss in
Supreme Court; begin draft of supporting Memorandum 250 hours

$56250;"
211 0109 "Continue draft of Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
research specific performance judgment issues 3 70 hours $83250;"
2/11109 "Complete draft of Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss; draft Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
draft letter to client; analyze objection to costs and fees 4..30 hours
$967.50;"
2/23/09 "Review opposition to Motion to Dismiss and analyze; research case
law cited by appellant and analyze; telephone conference with Stephan
Kenyon at Supreme Court; researchjurisdictional issues 2.40 hours

$54000;"
2/24/09 "Research 'finality' issues; continue draft of Reply to Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; draft letter to client 330 hours
$74250;"
3/16/09 "Review Clerk's Record on Appeal; draft Request for Addition; draft
letter to Merlyn Clark 1. 70 hours $382 50;"
3124/09 "Review Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal and analyze; review
IR.C.P . 58(a); draft letter to client; telephone conference with Richard
Webber 080 hours $18000;"
3/27/09 "Telephone conference with Richard Webber; Ieview request for
certification of interlocutory appeal and analyze 1 40 hours $315 00;"
3/29109 "Research permissive appeal issues 1 30 hours $29250;"
3/30/09 "Draft letter to client; continue research as to requirement for
interlocutOIY appeal 0.70 hours $157 50;'
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3/31/09 "Draft Objection; draft Affidavit of client; begin draft of Memorandum
in Support of Objection 7.50 hours $1,68750;"
4/1109 "Continue draft of Memorandum in Support of Objection 280 hours

$630.00;"
4/2/09 "Review E-mail fiom client; revise draft of Objection 0 80 hours

$18000;'
4/3/09 "Revise draft of Memorandum in Support of Objection; draft Motion for
Entry of Judgment; draft Judgment 250 hours $562.50 . "
These entries, including at least a part of the last entry, appear to relate to the appeal to
the Supreme Court These fees should not be included in any award of fees by the District
Court, but lather should be left to the Supreme Court to determine when the appeal,
which is currently pending, is ultimately decided. The total number ofhoUlS is 534
hoUls or $12,015.
There are additional entries that appear to be unrelated to this case They are:

4/17/09 "Draft letter to client; draft letter to J olm Thornton; continue research on
foreclosure of Vendor's Lien 1 70 hours $38250;"
4/20/09 "Finalize letter to Mr Thornton; telephone conferences with Richard
Webber; research foreclosure issues 2.40 hours $54000;"
4121109 "Telephone conference with Richard Webber; telephone conference
with John Thornton; prepare documents for Mr Thornton; work on
Judgment issues 140 hoUls $315.00

Neither John Thornton nor Richard Webber have any known relevance to this lawsuit and
any fees incurred to communicate with them should be denied The total hours ofthese
entries is 3.5 hours or $787.50.
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I. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' request for an award of attorney fees should be
denied or at the very least, reduced to deny the claims fO! unnecessary or unrelated time and
labor

DATED THIS

a #:-

dayofJune, 2009.
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

BY~~
-'Merlyii W Clark, ISB No.1 026
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

of June, 2009, I caused to be selved a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiJ/}
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO DISALLOW
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES, and addressed to each ofthe
following:
Derek A. Pica, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N Capitol Blvd, Ste 302
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

_ _ U.s. Mail, Postage PI epaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy - (208) 336-4980

:z

Me~
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D, John Ashby, ISB No, 7228
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IHE FOURTH TUDIClAL P1STRICT
OF THE STATE- OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COt.T.NTY OF ADA
FR.Al\U( J rAZZlO, TR, and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO. husband and wife, and IDAliO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY. LLC. an Idaho

)
)
)

Ctj.~e No"

CV OC 0801215

AUG 05 20ng
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302

J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
ByP. BOURNE
OEPUTY

BOISE,ID 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BARNo. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD J. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
TO DETERMINE THE
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES

----------------------------~)
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

DEREK A. PICA, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

That Affiant is the attorney of record for the Plaintiffs in the above entitled

action and has personal knowledge of all facts set forth herein.
2.

Your Affiant has reviewed the provisions of Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides a list of criteria to be utilized by the Court in

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S
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.,

determining reasonable attorney's fees. In evaluating the reasonableness of the fees
charged herein, your Affiant would advise the Court as follows:
(a)

Time and Labor Involved: I keep an accounting of time spent on

my cases. I have reviewed all of the billing sheets generated from this case and believe
the time and labor reported were reasonably and necessarily incurred to provide a proper
prosecution and representation in this matter.
(b)

Novelty and Difficulty: I believe this case was somewhat

complex with respect to the specific performance issues raised at summary judgment.
( c)

Skill, Experience and Ability: I have been practicing for more

than 22 years, during which time I have frequently engaged in civil litigation and have
handled many contested matters. I feel I am qualified to act as trial counsel in civil
litigation matters based upon my background and experience.
(d)

Prevailing Charges: The rates charged in this case are standard,

customary and comparable to other amounts charged for trial work for private clients for
this type of case. As such, I believe that my charges in this case are consistent with, or
lower than, the fees charged by other attorneys in the area with comparable experience.

In doing so, I would note the recent Supreme Court case of Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho
772,203 P.3d 702 (2009). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the District
Court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in the Boise area ranges from
$250.00 an hour to $400.00 an hour. See itl. at 777,203 P.3d at 707.
(e)

Fee: The fee agreement among Plaintiffs and me provides for

hourly billings consistent with the rate of $225.00 an hour.
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(f)

Time Limitations: I have time limitations to the extent that I am a

solo practitioner, and all of my work on this case was done without help from other
attomeys or a paralegal. In contrast, Defendant had more than one attorney handling
much of this matter, including attendance at hearings.
(g)

Amount Involved & Results Obtained: In this action, Plaintiffs

sough specific performance of the contracts they had entered into with Defendant.
Plaintiffs were granted specific performance and were awarded Judgments totaling
$4,481,648.60. Plaintiffs were awarded all relief requested.
(h)

Undesirability of Case: I do not know of any undesirable feature

(i)

Professional Relationship: I have known the Plaintiffs for several

of the case.

years and have represented them in other matters.
(j)

Award in Similar Cases: Awards in similar disputes vary widely

depending upon the terms of the particular contracts.
(k)

Computer-Assisted Research: I use, and did utilize in this case,

computer-assisted research. The cost of computer research is not inexpensive, but I often
view this cost as a part of doing business and did not pas this cost on to the client. As
such, I have not requested reimbursement for this cost. I believe computer assisted
research is appropriate to maximize an attorney's time and minimize the fees charged to
the client.

0)

Other Factors: I know of no other factors.
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3.

Based upon the foregoing, Affiant has billed Plaintiffs $51,367.50 in

attorney's fees and $88.00 in costs in providing Plaintiffs legal services in this action.

DATED this

:t ~ day of August, 2009.
Derek A. Pica~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to hefo

{SEAL}

e this

.

~ day of August, 2009.

Residing at:_4".L~-6l-+--,-~J-:,---r-.....--.
My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, certify that on the ~ day of August, 2009, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT TO DETERMINE TI1E AMOUNT
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s)
indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the following
person(s):
Merlyn W. Clark
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

---.r/
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Derek A. Pica
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

FRANK 1. FAZZIO, JR., and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
EDWARD 1. MASON, an individual,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 36068-2009
Ada County Docket No. 2008-1215

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on October 1, 2009.

Therefore, good cause

appearmg,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:

l. Supplemental Judgment for Attomeys Fees and Costs, file-stamped September 17,2009.
DATED this

L'-C-

day of October 2009.

For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

cc: Counsel of Record

NO.----/liLerr-_ __
1'11.i€D
------_P.M.
_____

AM

S£P 1 7 2009

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
BOISE, ID 83702

J. DAVID NAVARRO CI
By JENNIFER KENNEDyerk
DEPUTY

TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE No.: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD 1. MASON, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0801215

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS

)

On September 9, 2009, the above-entitled action came before the Court on
Plaintiffs' Amended Memorandum of Costs filed June 4,2009 and Defendant's Second
Objection and Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Fees and
Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees filed June 17, 2009. Plaintiffs, Frank 1.
Fazzio, Jr. and Cindy Ann Fazzio, husband and wife, and Idaho Livestock Company,
LLC appeared by and through their attorney of record, Derek A. Pica. Defendant,
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Edward J. Mason, appeared by and through his attorney of record, Merlyn W. Clark of the
firm Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP. The Court, having heard the arguments of
each party's counsel; having reviewed the record on file herein; having determined that
Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and
the respective agreements entered into by the parties; having determined that the Idaho
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over attorney's fees claimed by Plaintiffs that were
incurred in the Idaho Supreme Court in the amount of$12,015.00; having disallowed
$2,529.00 in attorney's fees claimed by Plaintiffs; and for good cause appearing;
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
That Plaintiffs are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $36,911.50 and costs
in the amount of $88.00 for a total Judgment against Defendant, Edward J. Mason, in the
sum of $36,999.50 plus statutory interest thereon at the rate of 5.625% from the date of
filing of this Judgment until paid.

DATED this

k

day of September, 2009.

RICHARD D. GREENWOOD
DISTRICT JUDGE
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